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INFORMAL IMMUNITY: DON'T YOU LET
THAT DEAL GO DOWN
Marc L. Sherman*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person has knowledge of criminal activity, the government
is entitled to the evidence unless the informant would be implicated in
the crime.1 If the police or prosecuting attorneys need the evidence for
an investigation, they may force an informant to be a witness against his
own interests promising the witness that what he says will not be used
against him. When this immunity is given pursuant to federal statute,2
the obtained testimony can only be used against the witness as a basis for
perjury or another similar charge. Often, however, the police or prose-
cuting attorneys promise immunity to a witness, either orally or in writ-
ing, thus ignoring the statute. This information is then subsequently
used against the witness, as this Article will argue, in violation of fifth
amendment values.
The fifth amendment's prohibition against compelling a person to
incriminate himself, although a constitutional imperative, is riddled with
exceptions. Since 1985, the Supreme Court has recognized several ways
by which a person may be forced to incriminate himself: (1) when a
person waives his privilege,3 (2) when the statute of limitations bars pros-
ecution on the crime in question,4 (3) when the witness has received a
pardon,5 or (4) when the incrimination produces only infamy and not a
charge of a criminal offense.6
It is established that the government can also compel a person to
give evidence which might be incriminating by granting that person im-
* B.A., 1981, Classical Studies, Cowell College, University of California, Santa Cruz;
J.D. 1985, University of Southern California. The author would like to thank William J.
Genego and Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of Southern California Law Center for their
help and comments. In memoriam, M.M. Landres
1. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). U.S: CONST. amend. V reads:
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
2. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
3. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
4. Id. at 598.
5. Id. at 599.
6. Id. at 598.
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munity from prosecution.' The current federal immunity statute pro-
vides that:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify [in certain proceedings]...
the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testi-
mony or other information compelled under the order... may
be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prose-
cution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing
to comply with the order.'
The statute dictates that this formal immunity be approved by a judge in
order to protect both the witness' and government's interests. In con-
trast to this statutory form of immunity, prosecutors often promise wit-
nesses immunity without going through the steps mandated by statute.
This is informal immunity.
Informal immunity has none of the procedural safeguards of formal
immunity. It is not clear if prosecutors even have the power to grant it.
If they do not, the question arises as to whether testimony obtained
through a witness' reliance on a promise for informal immunity subse-
quently can be used against a witness. If the prosecutor indeed does have
authority to grant informal immunity, then to what extent is the witness'
testimony protected and is it protected for fifth amendment or contrac-
tual reasons? This Article attempts to answer some of these questions.
This Article may be of interest to three groups of people. The first
part, which discusses theories, policies and values underlying and ani-
mating the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause, will be of particu-
lar interest to scholars. In this section the self-incrimination clause is
historically and philosophically analyzed to establish a set of values
which must not be ignored by immunity law.
The second section, dealing with the current law of informal immu-
nity, is directed towards policy makers. The inadequacy and uncertainty
of these cases indicate the need for a federal statute enabling prosecutors
to enter into flexible immunity agreements with informant-witnesses who
have information about criminal activity which would incriminate them.
The proposed legislation protects the fifth amendment values explored in
the first section of the Article, while allowing law enforcement to obtain
inforniation about criminal activity which the current federal immunity
statute does not permit.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
8. Id.
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The second section also includes information useful to practitioners.
The cases discussing informal immunity agreements are presented and
analyzed. The problems involved in negotiation, implementing and liti-
gating such agreements are recognized. The cases show the current law
and explores potential theories applicable to such problems.
II. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. History
1. nemo tenetur maxim
When James Madison9 incorporated into the text of the fifth amend-
ment the words, "nor shall any person.., be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself,""0 he was articulating an idea as
ancient as the Talmud." Included in this sixth century compilation of
the Jewish teachings on the Torah was the maxim, ein adam meissim
atsmo rasha, which means, "a man cannot represent himself as guilty, or
as a transgressor." 12 It has been suggested that this maxim is a gloss on
the requirement in Deuteronomy 17:6 for two witnesses' evidence in a
capital case. Witnesses were construed to mean persons other than the
accused.13 The traditional reasoning for this rule seems to have been the
belief that testifying against oneself was inherently involuntary, because
it went against a person's instinct for self-preservation. Such testimony
was thought to be untrustworthy.14
No evidence exists that this Talmudic rule was a basis for the devel-
opment and adoption of the right 5 against self-incrimination in English
law.' 6 It does, however, demonstrate an early recognition of the ques-
tionability of compelling self-incrimination. The rule against self-incrim-
ination came into English law by a variety of precedents which built on
themselves and produced in the public an evolving sense of moral indig-
nation towards the concept that a government could force someone to
9. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 422-24 (1968).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
11. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 434.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 435.
14. Id. at 436-39. But cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (statements against interests are
thought to be trustworthy as matter of law of evidence).
15. In English law, the privilege against self-incrimination was technically a privilege,
while, as in American constitutional law, it had the status of a right which was difficult for the
state to undermine. This Article uses "privilege" and "right" interchangeably as synonyms for
the fifth amendment clause against self-incrimination. The philosophy of the distinction be-
tween "privilege" and "right" is tangential to the matters discussed in this Article.
16. L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 439-41.
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incriminate oneself.17
The idea that a person should not be compelled to incriminate him-
self developed as a direct reaction to the abuses of the oath ex officio.18
Early English law demanded witnesses take this oath that they would
truthfully answer interrogatories; however, witnesses were forced to
swear this even before being given any idea of the charge or content of
the interrogatories. The oath was imported in the thirteenth century, via
canon law, into the English secular courts. 9 Originally, anyone accused
of a crime had to take the oath. The oath allowed ecclesiastical courts to
find "controverted" truth. If a person refused to take the oath, he was
excommunicated.20 An extorted oath would theoretically produce truth
since a lie under the oath would send the sinner to the same hell to which
excommunication sent him. In addition to this double bind, the accused
had to contend with the unfairness of the procedure of the oath, for it
[w]as in part a sworn statement to give true answers to
whatever questions might be asked, . . . taken in ignorance by
the accused, that is, without his first having been formally
charged with the accusation against him or having been told
the identity of his accusers or the nature of the evidence against
him. Following the administration of the oath, the accused,
still in ignorance, was required to answer a series of interroga-
tories whose purpose was to extract a confession.21
The first objections to the oath derived from the unfairness of forc-
ing someone to swear to something about which they were not in-
formed.22 Such a criticism was inherent in the canon law maxim, nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, that no man should have to produce evidence
against himself.23 Later the oath became a political tool by the English
Star Chamber and High Commission to fight religious deviations during
the reformation when a religious schism developed in England, as in the
rest of Europe. The state imposed political pressures on those sects
which refused to conform to the state's religion, so the sects would admit
17. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (detail-
ing evolution of morality regarding death penalty); see also Radin, Cruel Punishment and Re-
spect for Persons: Super Due Process For Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1157 (1980)
(recognizing that court may think that moral worth can "encompass the idea of time-and-
culture-bound morality, as long as changes in central values are slow and slight").
18. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 45-382.
19. Id. at 46. For a complete history see id. at 45-382.
20. Id. at 46-48.
21. Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 59-63.
23. Id. at 64-66.
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to or change their treasonous beliefs or practices. Adherents of certain
sects were forced to take the oath prior to an inquisition regarding their
religious beliefs. If the "heretics" refused to swear, they could be sent to
jail for contempt.24 If they lied about their religious convictions, they
would, by their own beliefs, go to hell, while if they told the truth, they
would be convicted and put to death since the state viewed religious her-
esy as political treason.25
An early proponent of the right against incrimination was William
Tyndale, the first man to translate the Greek New Testament into Eng-
lish. 6 In the introduction to the fifth chapter of Matthew, Tyndale wrote
that the Bible generally permitted oaths:
"But if the superior would compel the inferior to answer that
[which] should be to the dishonour of God, or hurting of an
innocent, the inferior ought rather to die than to swear: neither
ought a judge to compel a man to swear against himself, that he
make him not sin and forswear.... 27
Tyndale explained, in another passage, that it was "'a cruel thing to
break up into a man's heart, and to compel him to put either soul or body
in jeopardy, or to shame himself.' ,28
By the middle of the sixteenth century, in part as a result of the
political-religious trials before the Star Chamber and High Commission,
the invocation of a right against self-incrimination became commonplace.
Professor Levy's summary of the invocations recorded in John Foxe's
popular Book of Martyrs indicates just what the common people thought
their rights were and why they had a right to silence.
Ordinary laymen-weavers, ironmakers, farmers, and hat-
ters-hoping vainly to save themselves from a horrible end, be-
gan routinely to balk the proceedings by pleading that they
would not incriminate themselves. Their language varied in
style. Philpot had said that he would not run himself upon the
pikes. Two years later, first Stephen Gratwick and then Mat-
24. Burrowes v. The High Commission Court, 3 BV strode 49, 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (1616).
25. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 48.
26. Id. at 62.
27. Id. at 63 (footnote omitted) (quoting ARBER, FIRST PRINTED ENGLISH NEW TESTA-
MENT 25 (photo. reprint n.d.); An Exposition Uppon the V, VI, VII, Chapters of Mathew (n.p.
1530), reprinted in W. TYNDALE, EXPOSITIONS AND NOTES ON SUNDRY PORTIONS OF THE
HOLY SCRIPTURES 56 (H. Walter ed. 1849)).
28. Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted) (quoting W. TYNDALE, THE OBEDIENCE OF A CHRIS-
TEN MAN, AND HOW CHRISTEN RULERS OUGHT TO GOVERN (1528), reprinted in W. TYN-
DALE, DOCTRINAL TREATISES AND INTRODUCTIONS TO DIFFERENT PORTIONS OF THE
HOLY SCRIPTURES 187, 203, 355 (H. Walter ed. 1848)).
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thew Plaise refused to answer articles which they called "a
snare, to get my blood." . . . Ralph Allerton declared, "If I
cannot have mine accusers to accuse me before you, my con-
science doth constrain me to accuse myself before you .......
Richard Gibson simply refused to take the oath and would say
nothing. Reinald Eastland, refusing the oath ex officio too, ar-
gued that an oath was lawful to end strife-like the old oath of
purgation-"but to begin a strife an oath is not lawful." In
1558 Elizabeth Young ... [was] threatened... with the rack
unless she swore and confessed her guilt for distributing hereti-
cal books.29
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the common-law
courts began to accept the proposition that no one should be forced to
incriminate himself. ° The disdain and arguments of ordinary people
against forced self-incrimination evolved into judicial doctrine. Before
Sir Edward Coke was appointed to the office of Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas in 1606, he both argued in favor of the nemo tenetur
312maxim" and acted in violation of it, as Attorney General. 2 Upon his
appointment to the bench he issued opinions and decisions which limited
the oath ex officio. In a section in Coke's Reports, under the heading,
"Of Oaths Before an Ecclesiastical Judge Ex Officio," Coke stated:
No man ecclesiastical or temporal shall be examined upon se-
cret thoughts of his heart, or of his secret opinion: but some-
thing ought to be objected against him what he hath spoken or
done. No lay-man may be examined ex officio, except in two
causes, and that was grounded upon great reason; for lay-men
for the most part are not lettered, wherefore they may easily be
inveigled and entrapped, and principally in heresy and errors of
faith.33
In 1609 Coke issued a prohibition against the High Commission
prosecuting a heresy case.34 Later, the High Commission was prohibited
from "interfering" in what Coke called the "temporal" matter of defama-
tion as Coke further attempted to limit the examination of men under
oath. The report of the case states:
29. Id. at 79.
30. Id. at 245.
31. Collier v. Collier, I Cro. Eliz. 201; 4 Leo. 194; Mo. 906, 78 Eng. Rep. 457, 74 Eng.
Rep. 816, 72 Eng. Rep. 987 (1589).
32. Coke himself was guilty of brutal torture. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 230.
33. Co. Rep. 26, 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1607).
34. The High Commission was an ecclesiastical arm of the royal government which was
responsible for prosecuting religious nonconformity. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 127.
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It was resolved, that the Ecclesiastical Judge cannot examine
any man upon his oath, upon the intention and thought of his
heart, for cogitationis poenam nemo emeret. And in cases
where a man is to be examined upon his oath, he ought to be
examined upon acts or words, and not of the intention or
thought of his heart; and if every man should be examined
upon his oath, what opinion he holdeth concerning any point of
religion, he is not bound to answer the same; for in time of
danger, quis modo tutus erit, if every one should be examined of
his thoughts. And so long as a man doth not offend neither in
act nor in word any law established, there is no reason that he
should be examined upon his thought or cogitation: for as it
hath been said in the proverb, thought is free.3 5
In Coke's last case involving the right against self-incrimination,
Burrowes v. The High Commission, 6 the Chief Justice surveyed previous
cases in which people were imprisoned for refusing to incriminate them-
selves.37 Coke repeatedly mentioned an unpublished case, Leigh's Case,38
decided by Chief Justice Byer under the reign of Queen Elizabeth. In
Leigh's Case, Leigh had been imprisoned for keeping silent after certain
articles had been read to him, relying on the nemo tenetur maxim. Leigh
was freed when the court ruled favorably on his writ of habeas corpus
that he was being held in violation of the law of the land.39 The other
cases mentioned in Burrowes only stood for the proposition that one did
not have to agree to take an oath if one did not know about what one was
to be asked. Leigh's Case, however, stood for the broader proposition
that one should not have to be witness against oneself at all.
In Burrowes, the defendants had been in jail three-quarters of a year
for refusing to swear an oath.' Coke said that they "desired a copy of
the articles against them from the register, which was denied them; for
their refusal to answer upon this oath, ex officio; they were therefore
committed."'" The defendants were released by bail because, "when
they demanded the articles, they ought to have had of them a copy."42
Coke gave two reasons for supplying a copy. "First, that by this, they
may know, whether the matter, for which they are questioned, be within
35. Edward's Case, 13 Co. Rep. 9, 10, 77 Eng. Rep. 1421, 1422 (emphasis in original).
36. 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (1661).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 42-43.
40. Id. at 42.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id.
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[the questioning court's] jurisdiction, or not. Secondly, that by this they
may know what answer they are to make to the matters against them."
'43
Thus, Coke limited his holding to a right for someone to know the
charges against him. Coke's colleague on the bench, Justice Croke, how-
ever, voiced a broader moral invective against the oath, both in respect to
its use by the High Commission and the Star Chamber, when he said,
"[tjhis is inventio diaboli, ad detrudendas animas hominum, ad
diabolum."'
Although the decisions in Coke's time were limited to overruling the
oath to the extent that a person had not been given advance notice of the
questions he was expected to answer, much of Coke's reasoning, and
tone, indicates support for the idea that it was wrong to compel self-
incrimination. Apparently, people connected the unfairness of swearing
to an oath to give truthful testimony about unknown charges with the
more general principle that it was unfair for a person to be forced to
supply the state with self-incriminating evidence. Although the two
ideas are analytically distinct, there is a link: in both situations a witness
is forced to provide the government with evidence that would be used
against him and which the government would not have otherwise had.
This was a change in the general perception of the nemo tenetur maxim.
As Professor Levy wrote:
There had been a time when the maxim that no man is bound
to accuse himself meant merely that he was not obliged to dis-
close voluntarily his own guilt when he was not even suspected.
But more and more people were beginning to think that to co-
erce a man to testify against himself, with or without oath, was
simply unjust-an outrage on human dignity and a violation of
the very instinct of self-preservation.45
By the middle of the seventeenth century, a judge asked a defendant
if he had confessed to a crime, and added, "[y]ou are not bound to an-
swer me, but if you will not, we must prove it."4 6 In 1679 a pardoned
witness was saved from being forced to "'calumniate himself.' ",a7 The
witness was thus not forced to infame or disgrace himself because the law
was deemed to be that" 'neither his life nor name must suffer, and there-
fore such questions must not be asked him.' ,,4" In 1696 Parliament
43. Id. at 46.
44. Id. Literally translated: "this is an invention of the devil, oppressing the souls of men,
diabolically."
45. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 263.
46. Id. at 313-14.
47. Id. at 317.
48. Id.
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guaranteed the accused a copy of an indictment against him, which as-
sured that an accused did not have to supply information which would
lead to his indictment.49 Accordingly, the purposes for which the nemo
tenetur maxim was uttered were halted: if the state did not have enough
information about a person to indict him, that person would not have to
give the information himself. The state, not the accused, would have to
supply the incriminatory evidence.
This hard-fought for right of knowing what one has been charged
with before agreeing to answer questions is but one strand of the rope
which is woven into the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimi-
nation. Analytically, it is the first step: if the state has to provide an
indictment, then the state must have enough externally derived evidence
against a person to obtain the indictment. This precludes the state from
coercing incriminatory information from people whom the state thinks
might have committed a crime. The state has to develop enough of a
case to get an indictment without a person being compelled to incrimi-
nate himself. The nemo tenetur maxim arose in conjunction with other
judicial principles also related to a right against self-incrimination. The
other principles, to be discussed next, also supply values which fifth
amendment jurisprudence must recognize.
2. Voluntary confessions and torture
From the middle of the sixteenth century, English law contained the
notion that confessions had to be voluntary to be admitted into evidence.
Originally, the law of evidence demanded two witnesses to an overt act of
treason to establish a defendant's guilt.5" A confession could also estab-
lish guilt, but the confession had to be made "willingly and without vio-
lence." ' This value of only accepting voluntary confessions made its
way into legal treatises by the early 17th century:
If one is indicted or appealed of felony, and on his arraignment
49. 7 Win. III ch. 3.
50. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 129 (2d ed. 1923).
51. Id. (quoting Stat. 1 Edw. VI, c. 12 § 22 (1547)); see also BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONG 418 (1962):
The confession of the prisoner, which shall countervail the necessity of such proof,
must be in open court. In the construction of which Act it has been held, that a
confession of the prisoner, taken out of court, before a magistrate or person having
competent authority to take it, and proved by two witnesses, is sufficient to convict
him of treason. But hasty unguarded confessions, made to persons having no such
authority, ought not to be admitted as evidence under this statute. And indeed, even
in cases of felony at the common law, they are the weakest and most suspicious of all
testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises of favour, or
menaces; seldom remembered accurately, or reported with due precision; and incapa-
ble in their nature of being disproved by other negative evidence.
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he confesses it, this is the best and surest answer that can be in
our law for quieting the conscience of the judge and for making
it a good and firm condemnation; provided, however, that the
said confession did not proceed from fear, menace, or duress;
which if it was the case, and the judge has become aware of it,
he ought not to receive or record this confession, but cause him
to plead not guilty and take an inquest to try the matter.
52
Actual practice did not adhere to such legal values. The century
between 1540-1640 was a bloody one: most of the torture that ever oc-
curred in England happened during this period .5  A voluntary confes-
sion, in fact, was not necessarily voluntary, free or uncoerced; a
voluntary confession was often made in open court after a person had
been tortured and while under the threat of more torture if the confession
was repudiated. 4 The law of torture was so sophisticated that the con-
fession had to be repeated in court within twenty to twenty-four hours
after the confession was obtained in order to be admitted. 5 There is,
however, also evidence that an official written version of the extra-judi-
cial confession could be entered into evidence against the accused; this
evidence would not stand alone to convict someone of treason unless
there were two witnesses. 6
Several reasons were offered to support the need for voluntary con-
fessions. Essentially, involuntary confessions were, and are, deemed to
be untrustworthy.57 Wigmore indicates two situations in which confes-
sions can be assumed to be untrustworthy: when there is a promise or a
threat involved. A promise provides an incentive for a person to give
whatever information the promisor wants. Ideally, if the informant gives
an answer which pleases the promisor, the implication is that he may get
a lighter sentence. This answer, however, is not necessarily a truthful
answer. A threat, on the other hand, may also produce untruthful infor-
mation. An informant may want to avoid a harsher sentence, or physical
pain, and so may tell the interrogator anything the interrogator wants to
hear. Wigmore stated:
52. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 50, at 128 (quoting STAUNDFORD, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
§§ 6.2, 6.51).
53. See J. HEATH, TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW 74-166 (1982); LANGBEIN, TORTURE
AND THE LAW OF PROOF 73-139 (1977); PARDINE, USE OF TORTURE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND (1836).
54. See J. HEATH, supra note 53, at 31 (continental law demanded ratification of confes-
sions obtained through torture).
55. See LANGBEIN, supra note 53, at 15.
56. See J. HEATH, supra note 53, at 92.
57. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (Chadbeum rev. ed. 1970).
58. Id.
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The ground of distrust of confessions made in certain situ-
ations is, in a rough and indefinite way, judicial experience.
There has been no careful collection of statistics of untrue con-
fessions, nor has any great number of instances been even
loosely reported but enough have been verified to fortify the
conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct,
that under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective
mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge
guilt. This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is
placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of
guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives be-
tween which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk
that may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to
some worse alternative associated with silence.
59
Further, such confessions would run all the risks normally associ-
ated with an inquisitorial system: information could be supplied to the
accused which would then become the basis of a confession which would
appear truthful. Nonetheless, the confession could still be contrived by
the informant in order to avoid pain or gain the reward promised.60
Torture was particularly threatening and thus apt to produce un-
trustworthy testimony. A person might lie to avoid immediate physical
pain, taking his chances with a false confession of guilt instead. In fact,
Stephens, in his History of Criminal Law, stated:
59. Id. at n.1; J. STEPHENS, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 446 n.1 (1883) (quoting
STEVENS, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE) fleshes this out:
"Confessions caused by Inducement, Threat, or Promise, when Irrelevant in Crimi-
nal Proceedings-No confession is deemed to be voluntary if it appears to the judge
to have been caused by any inducement, threat, or promise, proceeding from a person
in authority, and having reference to the charge against the accused person, whether
addressed to him directly or brought to his knowledge indirectly; and if (in the opin-
ion of the judge) such inducement, threat, or promise, gave the accused person rea-
sonable grounds for supposing that by making a confession he would gain some
advantage or avoid some evil in reference to the proceedings against him. A confes-
sion is not involuntary only because it appears to have been caused by the exhorta-
tions of a person in authority to make it as a matter of religious duty, or by an
inducement collateral to the proceeding, or by inducements held out by a person not
in authority. The prosecutor, officers of justice having the prisoner in custody, mag-
istrates, and other persons in similar positions, are persons in authority. The master
of the prisoner is not as such a person in authority, if the crime of which the person
making the confession is accused was not committed against him. A confession is
deemed to be voluntary if (in the opinion of the judge) it is shown to have been made
after the complete removal of the impression produced by inducement, threat, or
promise which would otherwise render it involuntary. Facts discovered in conse-
quence of confessions improperly obtained, and so much of such confessions as dis-
tinctly relate to such facts, may be proved."
60. J. STEPHENS, supra note 59, at 446 n.1; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-
89 (1964).
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The general maxim, that confessions ought to be voluntary, is
historically the old rule that torture for the purpose of ob-
taining confessions is, and long has been, illegal in England. In
fact it cannot be said that it ever was legal, though it seemed at
one time as if it were likely to become legal.6
Consequently, torture was not seen as a legitimate way to obtain truthful
testimony.62 Its method for obtaining evidence produced suspect evi-
dence: confessions, not admissions, which were deemed worthy because
they were a response to pain, not guilt or knowledge.
Torture was most often used in England before 1640 to extract con-
fessions from religious heretics who committed treason by refusing to
yield to or abide by the state religion.63 It was recognized in the twelfth
century that what was said under torture was "prima facie unreliable";
64
thus such testimony was required to be ratified in open court.6 Addi-
tionally, as alluded to by Stephens above, the legality of testimony made
during or after torture was always dubious. 66 Nevertheless, within one
century, over eighty warrants for torture were issued in England.67
Commentators for many years have enumerated several reasons not
to validate the use of torture. An initial criticism was that torture pun-
ishes by pain before an accused is duly convicted, whether the accused
was ultimately found guilty or not. Coke described the cruelty of the
torturer by analogizing him to Virgil's Radamanthus, the judge of hell,
who
punished before he heard, and when he had heard his denial, he
compelled the party accused by torture to confess .... And
accordingly all the said ancient authors are against pain, or tor-
ment to be put or inflicted upon the prisoner before attainder,
nor after attainder, but according to the judgment. And there
is no one opinion in our books, or judicial records (that we have
seen and remember) for the maintenance of tortures or tor-
61. J. STEPHENS, supra note 59, at 447.
62. This would be sidestepped by Sir Francis Bacon who defended torture in 1603 saying,
"by the law of England no man is bound to accuse himself. In the highest cases of treason,
torture is used for discovery and not for evidence." J. HEATH, supra note 53, at 159 (quoting
SPEDDING, Letters and Life III 114).
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Torture must be distinguished from punish-
ment; it is only used, in the sense applicable here, before trial.
64. J. HEATH, supra note 53, at 74-166.
65. Id. at 31.
66. This debate is beyond the scope of this Article. The question revolved around whether
or not it was within the authority of the king's prerogative. See LANGBEIN, supra note 53, at
129-34.
67. J. HEATH, supra note 53, at 94-128.
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ments .... 68
A broader version of this value was the perception that torture itself was
cruel and unusual.69
More utilitarian reasons against torture have been advanced. Tor-
ture, as stated earlier, is particularly likely to produce untrustworthy in-
voluntary confessions. Innocent persons might succumb to pain and
torment and confess to things they never did. 0 As a method of obtaining
truth, torture is not only uncivilized, but also unreliable. Consequently,
by the end of the eighteenth century, torture was abolished in most of
Europe.7 1 England ended the use of torture in 1640,72 about the same
time that the right against self-incrimination became widely judicially
accepted.73
Although the evidentiary exclusion of involuntary or tortured con-
fessions is analytically different from the right against self-incrimina-
tion,74 the connection between the two has been discussed by
commentators. 75  Dean Griswold noticed this connection in an oft-
quoted passage of his book which defended the right to invoke the fifth
amendment. He wrote:
I would like to venture the suggestion that the privilege
against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in
man's struggle to make himself civilized. As I have already
pointed out, the establishment of the privilege is closely linked
historically with the abolition of torture. Now we look upon
torture with abhorrence. But torture was once used by honest
and conscientious public servants as a means of obtaining infor-
mation about crimes which could not otherwise be disclosed.
We want none of that today, I am sure. For a very similar
68. COKE, INSTITUTES 35 (n.p. 1797). It should be remembered that Coke himself partici-
pated in torture. See also Voltaire who said, "The law (loi) does not convict them, yet it
inflicts on them, on account of the uncertainty whether it is their crime, a punishment more
frightful than the death that is given them when it is certain that they deserve it" in OEUVRES
COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE. LANGBEIN, supra note 53, at 179 n.38 (quoting VOLTAIRE,
OEUVRES COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE § 5:403, at 411 (Paris 1835).
69. But since it is analytically not a punishment, torture is not prohibited by the eighth
amehdment. It is, however, a violation of due process.
70. LANGBEIN, supra note 53, at 9.
71. Id. at 66-69.
72. See id. at 134-35.
73. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 327-28.
74. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 822 (involuntary confession is untrustworthy; it is not a
"breach of confidence or of good faith."); see also Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 34 MINN. L. REV. 17-18 (1949).
75. L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 327-28; E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7
(1955).
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reason, we do not make even the most hardened criminal sign
his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever
that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the
course of history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity
and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil
man is a human being.76
Since the values which account for the abolition of torture and
which favor only voluntary confessions historically developed with other
values animating the right against self-incrimination, it is difficult to sep-
arate them. Society's repulsion at the cruelty of torture resembles the
affront to dignity we feel when someone is forced to incriminate himself.
This may be because of the historical connection between torture and the
right against self-incrimination, or it may stem from deeper moral roots,
specifically the idea that prying words from an accused's lips is repug-
nant when done through physical force or judicial (or governmental)
coercion.
3. Incompetency of the accused to testify
A final thread of the fifth amendment is the common-law doctrine
that prohibited an accused from testifying.77 The underlying theory was
that someone with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding was in-
competent to testify because he would be especially likely to testify
falsely.7" Consequently, the accused could not be trusted to provide ac-
curate testimony. At the time Coke published his Institutes in the middle
of the seventeenth century79 an "accused" was universally disqualified in
76. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 75, at 7. See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 447-48 (1956) (Douglas J., dissenting):
[Tjhere are indications in the debates on the Constitution that the evil to be remedied
was the use of torture to exact confessions. See, e.g., Virginia Debates, 221, 320-21
(2d ed. 1805); 2 Elliot's Debates, Ill (2d ed. 1876). It was, indeed, the condemna-
tion of torture to exact confessions that was written into the early law of the Ameri-
can Colonies. Article 45 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 provided in
part, "No man shall be forced by Torture to confesse any Crime against himselfe nor
any other .... " Connecticut adopted a similar provision. Laws of Connecticut
Colony (1865 ed.), 65. Virginia soon followed suit: "... . noe law can compell a man
to sweare against himselfe in any matter wherein he is lyable to corporall punish-
ment." Hening, Statutes at Large, Vol. II, 422.
The Compulsion outlawed was moral compulsion as well as physical
compulsion.
77. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 324. See also United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
578-82, 587-91 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (recitation of
continental law which states defendants cannot take the stand in relation to privilege against
self-incrimination).
78. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 575, at 996.
79. Id. at 990.
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civil cases. By the end of that century, criminal defendants were also
prohibited from testifying. 0 This rule has since been repudiated by every
common-law jurisdiction except Georgia."' Besides relating to witness
competency, the rule may also have been a device to protect a defend-
ant's right against self-incrimination."
Many opposed changing the rule because they believed such a
change would erode the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 A modi-
fied version of the rule effectively precluded a defendant's silence from
being incriminatory. If a defendant were allowed to testify, he could be
impeached in cross-examination. Alternatively, a jury might infer guilt
from the defendant's decision not to take the stand. 4 The common-law
rule allowed a defendant to tell his own story, without being under oath.
In this way, a defendant could tell the jury what he wanted. The testi-
mony was not considered real evidence, though the jury could be moved
by it. 5 The rule was repudiated in order to permit a defendant's testi-
mony to have full evidentiary value.8 6 But the idea that an accused
80. Id. at 995.
81. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570 (1961).
82. See L. LEvY, supra note 9, at 324.
83. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 578-79.
84. Id. See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 578, at 1009.
85. J. WIGMORE, supra note 50, at 995.
86. The Supreme Court, in discussing the rule, quoted Macaulay's defense of the rule that
'evidence should be taken at what it may be worth, that no consideration which has a ten-
dency to produce conviction in a rational mind should be excluded from the consideration of
the tribunals.'" Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 575 (quoting LORD MACAULAY'S LEGISLATIVE MIN-
UTES, 127-28 (n.p. 1835)). Compare this quote with I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) which the Court also cites with approval:
On the other hand, I am convinced by much experience that questioning, or the
power of giving evidence, is a positive assistance, and a highly important one, to
innocent men, and I do not see why in the case of the guilty there need be any
hardship about it....
The propriety of making the parties competent witnesses in civil cases is no
longer disputed. It is difficult to say why the same rule should not apply to criminal
cases also. One objection to the admission of such evidence rests upon the false sup-
'position that a witness is to be believed because he is sworn to speak the truth. The
proper ground for admitting evidence is not that people are reluctant to lie but that it
is extremely difficult to lie minutely and circumstantially wit.tout being found
out ....
... Some precautions might properly be observed in admitting such evidence. If
the prisoner did not offer his testimony it would be hard to allow the prosecution to
call him. The fact of his refusing to testify would always have its weight with the
jury. By leaving him to be examined in chief by his own counsel and cross-examined
by the counsel for the crown the danger of placing the judge in a position hostile to
the prisoner would be avoided. I should regard this as so important an object that
unless it could be fully secured I should prefer to maintain the existing law as it
stands.
Id. at 442, 445.
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should not be subjected to a jury's conjecture regarding a decision
whether to testify or not, still has currency in fifth amendment
jurisprudence.87
B. Policies and Values
The historical strands of the right against self-incrimination, to-
gether with cases and commentary, suggest several utilitarian and deon-
tological values animating the fifth amendment. These are discussed in
this subsection of this Article. Justifications of the privilege proliferate
like rabbits breeding. In McNaughton's revision of Wigmore's Evidence,
he surveys examples of commentaries declaring the meaning behind the
fifth amendment; this encompasses fourteen pages of small print in a
footnote.88 In the treatise, he extracts at least twelve different policy con-
siderations which'commentators have identified. 9 He dismisses most of
them as irrelevant, merely descriptive, platitudinal or deductions of other
policy considerations.9" He maintains that the central policies of privi-
lege are:
(1) the frustration of prosecutions for crimes of conscience, "espe-
cially in the area of political and religious beliefs"; 91 (2) the contribution
of a "fair state-individual balance" in which the state has to leave the
individual alone unless good cause is shown not to, and in which the state
bears the burden of establishing that good cause;92 (3) the prevention of
torture and other inhumane treatments of human beings: this includes
physical and psychological compulsion; (4) preventing individuals from
having to decide the trilemma between harmful disclosure, contempt or
perjury; (5) the prohibition of "compelling a witness to commit the 'un-
natural act' of inflicting injury on himself."
93
These considerations implicate various fifth amendment values.
Each, independently, may be a sufficient reason for the right against self-
incrimination. The privilege is, however, animated by the overlap of all
87. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (no inference of guilt because of defend-
ant's failure to testify); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978) (judge may admonish jury to
take no inference from defendant not testifying).
88. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 225, at 297-310 n.2 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
89. Id. at 310-18.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 313-14.
92. Id. at 317-18, 314-15. McNaughton treats prevention of "fishing expeditions" and the
state-individual balance as two separate but related considerations. Since, however, the two
are animated by a sort of probable cause rationale, this Article combines them.
93. Those last three are treated as one by McNaughton, but are easily understood as three
connected values.
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of these considerations, different values being more or less relevant in
different situations.
One major policy consideration may aptly be described as the over-
lap of the first and fifth amendments.94 History shows that the right to
refuse to incriminate oneself is intimately connected with the right of
conscience. 95 If the state is allowed to probe into a person's mind to
discover unpopular religious or political beliefs, those beliefs are not pro-
tected; unpopular associations may be revealed and non-judicial punish-
ments may occur because of the revelations.96 Justice Douglas noted this
possibility in his dissent in Ullmann v. United States.97 In Ullmann, the
Supreme Court affirmed that an immunity statute displaced the danger
for which the privilege exists. The Court required Ullmann to answer
the question of whether he had ever been a member of the Communist
Party.98 In addition to the possible immediate dangers that such a dis-
closure might have brought Ullmann, Douglas commented on the inter-
play between the first and fifth amendments. He said:
The guarantee against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth
Amendment is not only a protection against conviction and
prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity
and freedom of expression as well. My view is that the Framers
put it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to con-
fess his crimes. The evil to be guarded against was partly self-
accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of
the evil. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved.
So too was his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment. The Framers, therefore, created the feder-
ally protected right of silence and decreed that the law could
not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness
against himself.99
The second policy consideration concerning a fair state-individual
balance has two prongs. The first prong deals with our common-law her-
itage and the Anglo-American system's accusatorial, as opposed to in-
quisitorial, method of determining guilt and innocence. In our system,
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech." This is not the place to demonstrate exactly where, when and how the two amend-
ments overlap. That would be another Article.
95. See supra notes 9-49 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Boudin, The Constitutional Privilege in Operation, 12 LAw. GUILD REV.
122 (1952) (fifth amendment protects areas first amendment is supposed to protect).
97. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
98. Id. at 424, 439.
99. Id. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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the government must prove its case against the accused. The accused is
under no obligation to help the government fortify its case. Supreme
Court Justice Fortas suggested that this method was part of our underly-
ing political traditions.100 When a person is assumed innocent until
proven guilty, his autonomy and sovereignty is protected. Only if an
individual is assumed sovereign is he able to participate in democracy, a
democracy which is comprised of autonomous sovereigns. Were a gov-
ernment able to force self-incriminatory testimony from an individual,
the wall of separation between state and individual would crumble and
the basis for democracy-ypluribus unum (out of many, one)-would be
lost, because only the government remains.
An Englishman's home was his castle; his life was his invi-
olable temple. Where his life, his freedom from official re-
straint, his beliefs and opinions were at issue, he was no longer
a subject of the state. He himself was a sovereign. He had the
sovereign right to refuse to cooperate; to meet the state on
terms as equal as their respective strength would permit; and to
defend himself by all means within his power-including the
instrument of silence. He could rest on the presumption of in-
nocence. He could put the state to its proof. The state and he
could meet, as the law contemplates, in adversary trial, as
equals-strength against strength, resource against resource,
argument against argument. The duty to cooperate came to an
end at the threshold of conflict between the state and the
individual.
The privilege against self-incrimination, therefore, was a
part of the seventeenth century's compact theory of govern-
ment which a little later received its classic expression by John
Locke. The divine right of kings and the theory of the absolute
power of government were repudiated. The state was merely
an instrument created by contract in which rulers and the ruled
were parties on equal terms; and the state's authority was lim-
ited by the terms of the compact.
The principle that a man is not obliged to furnish the state
with ammunition to use against him is basic to this conception.
Equals, meeting in battle, owe no such duty to one another,
regardless of the obligations that they may be under prior to
battle. A sovereign state has the right to defend itself, and
100. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo TeneturProdereSeipsum, 25 CLEV. B.A. 91, 98-
99 (1954).
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within the limits of accepted procedure, to punish infractions of
the rules that govern its relationships with its sovereign individ-
uals. But it has no right to compel the sovereign individual to
surrender or impair his right of self-defense.1"'
Thus, the fifth amendment may have political implications deeper
than those which arise from its connections with the first amendment.
The fifth amendment may embody libertarian commitments without
which democracy itself would be threatened. Without a government re-
specting the privacy and the autonomy of its citizens, the constituents of
the democratic body politic would be unable effectively to carry out their
democratic duties.
The second policy of this consideration stems from the presumption
in our society that we as individuals have a "right to be left alone" unless
there is special cause for the state's interference.1"2 This can be decon-
structed into two parts. The libertarian notion is that, prima facie, indi-
viduals have a right of privacy protected by the fifth amendment with
which the government should not interfere. Justice Brandeis recognized
this when talking about the fourth and fifth amendments:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much
broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feel-
ings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in mate-
rial things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intru-
sion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be
101. Id. See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (prohibi-
tion against compulsory self-incrimination is "'the result of the long struggle between the
opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the collective power of
the State on the other' ").
102. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionality Protected Privacy under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977) (privacy aspects of fifth amend-
ment balanced against pragmatic consequences of that privacy).
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deemed a violation of the Fifth.103
The history of the privilege, both in its development stage in Eng-
land, and during the McCarthy era in this century, graphically shows the
power of a state unchecked by the individual's right against self-incrimi-
nation. 1" 4 If an accused is privileged to be silent, his accusers cannot
bring him before a tribunal and interrogate him with the hope of getting
some information that might be used against him. A society might want
to prohibit such coercion because an insignificant act or suspicion might
become the basis for an otherwise unjustified investigation. Prosecutors
could selectively prosecute people, forcing them to incriminate them-
selves since, as it has been said, everyone has committed at least some
small prosecutable crime.105 This is not the sort of discretion, or power,
we want prosecutors to have. Further, the investigation might be for
political reasons. In any case, the accused would be harassed and lose
valuable time, and possibly community esteem, if the government investi-
gated him in the hope that he would incriminate himself. This, however,
would fall under the same values as the above first amendment considera-
tions. We, as a society, may not want to subject our citizenry (i.e., our-
selves) to the whims of petty bureaucrats, or even the politically
ambitious, who might lead "fishing expeditions" for reasons other than
potential criminal activity, when there is little or no reason to expect
such activity exists. The fourth amendment requires that governmental
investigation be triggered only by probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
not evidence which we ourselves are forced to provide. In addition, we
might have a notion that it is an affront to one's dignity and autonomy to
be forced to incriminate oneself.
Justice Goldberg focused on the cruelty of forced self-incrimination
in terms of the privilege's historical development when he said, the fifth
amendment
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial sys-
tem of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance
103. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), over-
ruled, Bergen v. New York, 338 U.S. 41 (1967).
104. See supra notes 9-49 and accompanying text. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
440-55 (1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, at 314-15.
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by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load"; our respect for the inviolability of the human per-
sonality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life"; our distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."106
The reason why tortured, compelled confessions are antithetical to
the Anglo-American jurisprudential system was discussed earlier. His-
tory, as discussed in this Article, shows the inhumanity of the trilemma.
The idea that a person should not be forced to inflict injury on himself,
however, is harder to pin down. It may be a subset of our society's gen-
eral repugnance for suicide or selling oneself into slavery. Society's pro-
hibition on suicide and voluntary slavery stem from a liberal notion of
autonomy. 10 7 Kant, for example, postulated that this autonomy is based
on the integrity of the person.10 8 If that autonomy is alienated from the
person in such a way that it cannot again become a part of the person,
then the person qua person, no longer exists as an integral entity. Thus,
Kant would say, selling oneself into slavery is the sort of sale which,
when consummated, kills the person, because after the autonomous
choice to sell oneself, one can no longer make autonomous choices.109
Society does not let this happen because society itself is based on the
interconnection of individual autonomous persons. To allow such aliena-
tion would allow civilization itself to deteriorate. Thus, certain acts
Which destroy autonomy are prohibited by society.
Forcing people to disclose certain autonomous decisions should in-
volve the same alienation which Kant says cannot be allowed. In terms
of punishment, when the offense is capital, a forced self-incriminating
statement may be the proximate cause of death. Under this reasoning,
forcing a self-incriminatory statement is akin to forcing suicide. This ar-
gument would also prohibit voluntary confessions which society, in fact,
106. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
107. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (1965); see also Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1891-98 (1987) (discussing liberal notions
inalienability).
108. See I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 165 (L. Infield trans., J. MacMurray rev. ed.
1930) ("Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property;
... if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership.").
109. See, Richards, Commercial Self and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for
the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1979).
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encourages. These confessions have the same consequences for the loss
of autonomy as a forced confession. Autonomy, through punishment, or
through the disclosure of a private thought, is still compromised. Fur-
ther, voluntary confessions are more like suicide than forced confessions
because they are completely one's own. Thus, society paradoxically pro-
hibits forcing someone to incriminate himself because it is an infringe-
ment on autonomy, while still allowing one to voluntarily relinquish
one's autonomy through a confession even though the confession has the
same results. This may be inconsistent, but it would be impractical, and
possibly immoral, for society to ignore an individual's voluntary confes-
sion of guilt.
The history of the common-law shows a concern for convicting the
guilty and exonerating the innocent even at the cost of letting some guilty
people free.lO American constitutional law continues this tradition to
uphold certain values. As the following cases show, the values of pri-
vacy, integrity and autonomy of citizens emerge repeatedly .in opinions
and dissents by judges writing about the purposes of the fifth amend-
ment. Although these values may be products of the policies behind the
fifth amendment, these values are also independent values animating the
fifth amendment. Because these values are valuable in and of themselves,
they need to be discussed separately from the policy considerations devel-
oped to protect them.
In 1928, Justice Brandeis discussed the privacy value of the fifth
amendment. 1 I This fifth amendment privacy value has been repeated by
modern jurists. Justice Powell has written that the privilege "respects a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought ... 1,2" In a
dissent in the same case, Justice Marshall, commenting on the similar
concerns of the fourth and fifth amendments, stated, "[b]oth involve as-
pects of a person's right to develop for himself a sphere of personal pri-
vacy."'1 3 Justice Brennan has stated that the fifth amendment protects
matters which come within a "zone of privacy.
' 14
Last century, in Brown v. Walker,"5 Justice Field wrote a long dis-
sent from an opinion upholding a congressional immunity statute as con-
110. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-65 (1970) (government must prove criminal
guilt beyond reasonable doubt); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer"), overruled, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
113. Id. at 349 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 486 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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sistent with the fifth amendment. Field agreed with the defendant's
counsel who wrote:
both the safeguard of the Constitution and the common law
rule spring alike from that sentiment of personal self-respect,
liberty, independence and dignity which has inhabited the
breasts of English speaking peoples for centuries, and to save
which they have always been ready to sacrifice many govern-
mental facilities and conveniences. In scarcely anything has
that sentiment been more manifest than in the abhorrence felt
at the legal compulsion upon witnesses to make concessions
which must cover the witness with lasting shame and leave him
degraded both in his own eyes and those of others. What can
be more abhorrent ... than to compel a man who has fought
his way from obscurity to dignity and honor to reveal crimes of
which he had repented and of which the world was ignorant?116
Later, in the same dissent, Justice Field added:
The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to
expose his own guilt is obvious to every one, and needs no illus-
tration. It is plain to every person who gives the subject a mo-
ment's thought.
A sense of personal degradation in being compelled to in-
criminate oneself must create a feeling of abhorrence in the
community at its attempted enforcement.
1 17
Sixty years later, Justice Douglas wrote the fifth amendment is "a safe-
guard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression." 1 8
Further, insofar as the fifth amendment is a response to torture and the
abuses of government agents in coercing confessions, the fifth amend-
ment protects against such indignities.
The autonomy value presents a more difficult problem. Justice Field
did suggest that the privilege was animated by a regard for indepen-
dence,1" 9 which may be another name for autonomy. In addition, the
fifth amendment protections of those democratic processes based on au-
tonomous choice indicate that autonomy is another underlying value.
Autonomy, however, is a hard term to define. If autonomy indicates a
distinction between a citizen and his government, it underlies those pol-
icy considerations that portray the fifth amendment as a wall between the
individual and the state. If autonomy denotes thinking for oneself, the
116. Id. at 632 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 637 (Field, J., dissenting).
118. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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fifth amendment protects one by not allowing an accused to be coerced
or tortured into saying what he would not otherwise say. Autonomy
may also be just another word for dignity.
This section has explored the history, policy and values of the fifth
amendment. The respect of dignity, privacy and autonomy, as well as
utilitarian and democratic conceptions underlie the fifth amendment.
Such history, policy and values of the fifth amendment can only be pro-
tected when the state obtains voluntary information. If information a
prosecutor obtains is not voluntary, the very purpose and spirit of the
fifth amendment is violated. Any adjudication of immunity issues must
take these values into account and assure the voluntariness of the infor-
mation obtained.
III. IMMUNITY
A. Statutory Immunity
1. History
Shortly after the establishment of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in England, cases involving immunity statutes, called indemnity,
arose in England.' 20 In 1742, the House of Commons passed a bill of
indemnity immunizing testimony against prosecution, but the bill did not
pass the House of Lords because it would produce involuntary confes-
sions which were not deemed reliable. 121 Only the right against self-in-
crimination protected suspects from testifying against themselves. 122
Wigmore acknowledges that England has a long and established tradi-
tion of using immunity "as a lawful method of annulling the privilege
against self-incrimination.'
123
In the United States, the first compulsory immunity statute124 was
passed by Congress in 1857.125 This general act immunized a person
who testified before Congress, or one of its committees, from being "sub-
ject to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching [that] which
he shall be required to testify .... Because this statute allowed wit-
nesses to take "immunity baths" by testifying to everything illegal they
120. Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New
Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327, 332 (1966). See also Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 n.13 (1972).
121. See L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 328-29.
122. Id. at 329.
123. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, § 2281, at 493.
124. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. XIX, 11 Stat. 155 (1857).
125. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 333.
126. See supra note 124.
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may have ever done and then avoid prosecution, Congress rewrote the
statute within five years. 127 The new law 28 limited immunity to the ac-
tual testimony and allowed prosecution to be based on evidence which
was not derived from the testimony. 129 Thus, within the first five years of
immunity statutes in America, problems which have plagued immunity
statutes for the past hundred years became apparent: (1) how extensive
should immunity be to overcome the problems created by the self-incrim-
ination privilege, and (2) how narrow can immunity be so as to minimize
unpunished criminal activity?
In 1868, an immunity statute was passed which immunized wit-
nesses in judicial proceedings from having evidence obtained "in any
manner used against such party or witness.., in respect to any crime, or
for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture.. ,13o This law started
the case law of immunity when, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,13 1 the stat-
ute was declared invalid because it did not extend far enough to replace
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
Counselman was the agent of a railroad being investigated by a
grand jury in Illinois. When asked to answer certain questions, he re-
fused to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate him. 132
Although the statute barred use of his testimony against him, the Court
agreed that the statute compelling his testimony "could not, and would
not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be
used in evidence against him .. . In other words, his immunized
testimony could be used against him. Thus, immunized testimony could
be used as an investigatory tool to obtain evidence against the witness.
The Court determined that the immunity statute was therefore not
"coexistensive with [the fifth amendment]" and was inadequate to re-
place the privilege.'1
4
The Court reviewed state court decisions on this issue 135 and used
them to bolster its conclusion that "no statute which leaves the party or
witness subject to prosecution after he answers incriminating questions
put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by
127. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 334-35.
128. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. XI, 12 Stat. 333 (1882) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486 (1946)).
129. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 335-36.
130. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. XIII, 15 Stat. 37 (1868), amended by ch. 17, 18 Rev. Stat.
§ 860 (1875).
131. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
132. Id. at 560.
133. Id. at 564.
134. Id. at 565.
135. Id. at 565-84.
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the Constitution of the United States."' 36 Accordingly, the Court held,
"a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offence [sic] to which the question re-
lates."' 37 To abridge the constitutional privilege, the Court stated, the
legislature would have to replace or supply one "so broad as to have the
same extent in scope and effect [as the privilege]."'
' 38
Congress took the hint and revised the immunity statute in 1893.
The new immunity act was passed in connection with immunizing testi-
mony before the Interstate Commerce Commission and took a new ap-
proach to immunity. While disallowing any excuse for testifying before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the act provided that "no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may
testify.. .. ,,39 The language "any transaction," which replaced the "in
any manner used" wording of the statute overturned by Counselman,
proved significant because it prohibited the use of immunized testimony
to find other testimony which could be used against a witness. Transac-
tional immunity, which prohibits the government from prosecuting a
witness for a crime about which he testifies, became the model immunity
statute. 140
The 1893 statute was challenged and upheld in Brown v. Walker. 4 ,
Without explicitly saying so, the Court held that the statute supplied the
sort of absolute immunity the Counselman Court had sought. The
Brown Court wrote:
It is not that he shall not be prosecuted for or on account of any
crime concerning which he may testify, which might possibly
be urged to apply only to crimes under the Federal law and not
to crimes, such as the passing of counterfeit money, etc., which
are also cognizable under state laws; but the immunity extends
to any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may
testify, which clearly indicates that the immunity is intended to
be general, and to be applicable whenever and in whatever
court such prosecution may be had.'42
The statute also was interpreted to prohibit the states from using the
evidence obtained in federal court against witnesses in state prosecu-
136. Id. at 585.
137. Id. at 586.
138. Id. at 585.
139. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893).
140. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 342.
141. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
142. Id. at 608 (emphasis in original).
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tions. 143 Although the statute did not shield the witness from the "per-
sonal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime,""
it was not invalid because
[a] person who commits a criminal act is bound to contemplate
the consequences of exposure to his good name and reputation,
and ought not to call upon the courts to protect that which he
has himself esteemed to be of such little value. The safety and
welfare of an entire community should not be put into the scale
against the reputation of a self-confessed criminal, who ought
not, either in justice or in good morals, to refuse to disclose that
which may be of great public utility, in order that his neighbors
may think well of him. The design of the constitutional privi-
lege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to
protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to con-
vict him of a criminal charge. If he secures legal immunity
from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is
a penalty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay
for the common good.145
The statute was narrowly upheld, five to four. The dissenters rea-
soned that transactional immunity did not extend far enough because the
statute left open the possibility of prosecution. Justice Shiras wrote:
It is certainly speaking within bounds to say that the effect
of the provision in question, as a protection to the witness, is
purely conjectural. No court can foresee all the results and
consequences that may follow from enforcing this law in any
given case. It is quite certain that the witness is compelled to
testify against himself. Can any court be certain that a sure and
sufficient substitute for the constitutional immunity has been
supplied by this act; and if there be room for reasonable doubt,
is not the conclusion an obvious and necessary one?146
Justice Field had a different approach. He believed that the privi-
lege entitled a person to complete silence, not only because something
other than silence might lead to prosecution, but because the fifth amend-
ment protected individuals from the infamy and disgrace that disclosure
of crime often brings.14 7 He wrote: "The witness is entitled to the shield
of absolute silence.... [The fifth amendment] exempts him from prose-
143. Id. at 606-08. This holding was affirmed in Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
144. Brown, 161 U.S. at 605.
145. Id. at 605-06.
146. Id. at 627 (Shiras, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 631 (Field, J., dissenting).
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cution beyond the protection conferred by the act of Congress. It ex-
empts him where the statute might subject him to self-incrimination." 1
48
But the Court's majority was not persuaded by these arguments,
possibly for legal realist reasons. 149 First, politically, it was at their insis-
tence that the law was changed and the statutes' transactional approach
was a good faith attempt to abide by their demand for "absolute immu-
nity." Second, something more extensive than transactional immunity
would look like amnesty or a pardon a"' which might be perceived to al-
low criminals to get away with too much. The Court concluded that
allowing a witness to remain silent would make the obtaining of certain
evidence too difficult and would also be subject to abuse.'' Third, since
the middle of the century,* Bentham and some American followers had
been calling for the elimination of the privilege altogether, on the ration-
ale that it allowed crimes to be hidden from the public, crimes which the
public had the right to know of and prosecute.' 52
Following Brown, valid immunity statutes generally followed the
transactional model. Provisions were added specifying that only natural
persons could be immunized,' 53 disallowing corporations from obtaining
immunity.1 14 In 1911, provisions limiting immunity from shielding wit-
nesses against perjury charges were upheld in Glickstein v. United
States.'55 The Court reasoned that because the fifth amendment guaran-
tee only applied to past crimes, perjury, a future crime, could still be
prosecuted.' 5 6 An immunity statute excluding perjured statements was
therefore upheld because it was "in all respects commensurate with the
148. Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
149. See supra note 102.
150. Id. at 601.
151. Id. at 600. The Court reasoned:
The danger of extending the principle announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock is
that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely fanci-
ful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of
securing immunity to some third person, who is interested in concealing the facts to
which he would testify. Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of the
law, and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good
name, to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his
privilege.
Id.
152. For criticisms of the privilege see generally, J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 446-55 (Bowring ed. 1843); see also State v.
Wentworth, 65 Me. 234, 241 (1875) (justice is not promoted by the privilege).
153. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 349.
154. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
155. 222 U.S. 139, 143 (1911).
156. Id. at 142.
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protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation." '157 In 1943, the
Court held that if the immunity statute did not specifically demand that a
witness invoke his fifth amendment privilege before conferring immunity,
immunity would automatically be assumed.158 In response, Congress
added qualifications to certain statutes so that immunity would not un-
intentionally be granted.1 59
In the midst of the red scare of the 1950's, Congress updated the
immunity law of 1862 to enable it to pursue investigations that would not
be hampered by invocations of the fifth amendment.1 60 Congress passed
the Immunity Act of 1954161 which gave Congress and grand juries the
right to require testimony in national security investigations by providing
that no "witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfei-
ture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination. .... -162 This Act was immediately challenged and upheld
in Ullmann v. United States.1 63 Ullmann refused to answer questions
concerning his and others' participation and membership in the Commu-
nist Party. 1
64
Ullmann examined and disposed of all the old questions. The Court
reaffirmed Brown over Justice Douglas' vigorous dissent. Justice Doug-
las argued that the immunity statute did nothing to protect Ullmann
from being socially penalized upon disclosure of his political beliefs.165
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court: "the immunity granted need
only remove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation
of the privilege .... ,166 The Court discounted the potential loss of jobs,
passport eligibility and "general public opprobrium."'' 67 The opinion
formalistically concluded that, "[i]mmunity displaces the danger. Once
the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases. We reaffirm
Brown v. Walker, and in so doing we need not repeat the answers given
by that case to the other points raised by petitioner."1 68 The Court fur-
157. Id. at 141.
158. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 430 (1943).,
159. See Wendel, supra note 120, at 349.
160. See id. at 348-53. The Act of 1862, which allowed Congress to grant immunity, was a
"use" immunity statute which would not have withstood the test of Counselman.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1954) (repealed 1970).
162. Id.
163. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
164. Id. at 424.
165. Id. at 443-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 431.
167. Id. at 430.
168. Id. at 439 (footnote omitted).
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ther refused to pass on the merits of Ullmann's claim that inquiry into
his political associations was a first amendment violation with the non-
answer that "it is every man's duty to give testimony before a duly con-
stituted tribunal unless he invokes some valid legal exemption in with-
holding it.
' 169
In 1964, two developments dramatically changed fifth amendment
immunity jurisprudence. In Malloy v. Hogan,7 ' the Court determined
that through the fourteenth amendment the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was applicable to the states. State immunity statutes would there-
fore have to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, at least to the
same extent as federal immunity statutes.
On the same day, the Court also decided Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission .7 which extended the logic of Malloy and declared that one
jurisdiction's immunity grant had to be respected by other jurisdictions.
The Court held that the fifth amendment protected a state witness
against federal prosecution, and a federal witness against state prosecu-
tion.17 2 This holding follows from Malloy's dicta: "'the same standards
must determine whether [a witness'] silence in either a federal or state
proceeding is justified ... ' "173 But in elucidating the Murphy Court's
holding, Justice Goldberg changed the constitutional requisite for immu-
nity without argument, acknowledgment or justification. He wrote:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may
not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits
cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, more-
over, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Govern-
ments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Gov-
ernment must be prohibited from making any such use of
compelled testimony and its fruits. This exclusionary rule,
while permitting the States to secure information necessary for
effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal
Government in substantially the same position as if the witness
169. Id. at 439 n.15. This is nonresponsive because it asserts that the first amendment is not
a valid legal exemption to testifying. It also ignores the argument's premise that the fifth
amendment has historically been asserted to protect religious and political activity. See L.
LEVY, supra note 9, at 332.
170. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
171. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
172. Id. at 77-78.
173. Id. at 79 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (citations omitted)).
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had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of
immunity. 174
Employment of the word "use" overruled, sub silentio, Brown and Coun-
selman which premised the legitimacy of immunity statutes on giving
"absolute" immunity or immunity for any "transaction."
' 175
After Murphy, it was not clear whether the "transactional" immu-
nity of Brown, or the "use" immunity possibly approved by Murphy, was
the minimal immunity needed to be constitutionally acceptable.
1 76
Thereafter, Congress, moved by public sentiment increasingly hostile to
crime and immunity statutes 177 and perhaps cognizant of a change in the
Supreme Court's attitude, passed a new immunity act in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.178 The new immunity statute tracked Jus-
174. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
175. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 463 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
176. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
177. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Lib-
erties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 60, 84 (1970).
178. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). The pertinent parts of this act are 18 U.S.C. § 6002-6008 (1982). Section 6002
provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a com-
mittee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
Section 6003 reads:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for
the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accord-
ance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attor-
ney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide
other information he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request
an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary
to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
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tice Goldberg's language in Murphy and provided that neither the testi-
mony, nor evidence derived from the immunized testimony, could be
used against a witness.179 This "use and derivative use" immunity was
challenged and upheld in Kastigar v. United States.'80
Justice Powell's opinion in Kastigar revolved around the necessity to
reserve to government certain powers to compel testimony. Describing
"the general common-law principle that 'the public has a right to every
man's evidence' as an "indubitable certainty,"'' Justice Powell said,
"[i]mmunity statutes... are not incompatible with [the] values [of the
fifth amendment]."' 82 According to Justice Powell:
[T]hey seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to
compel citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes re-
flects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many of-
fenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of
giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime. In-
deed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, and
their primary use has been to investigate such offense. Con-
gress included immunity statutes in many of the regulatory
measures adopted in the first half of this century.
183
The use and derivative use immunity statute was thus found to be
consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman 184 because:
Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evi-
dence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this
protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using
the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures
that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal pen-
alties on the witness.
185
The Court bolstered this holding with dicta from Murphy which
noted that "immunity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and
the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the wit-
ness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a grant of immunity."'
186
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
180. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Such immunity is often now called "limited" immunity by the
broadcast media and popular press.
181. Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 445-46.
183. Id. at 446-47 (footnotes omitted).
184. Id. at 452-53.
185. Id. at 453.
186. Id. at 458-59 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)).
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Accordingly, use and derivative use immunity was "protection coexten-
sive with the privilege [and] is the degree of protection that the Constitu-
tion requires, and is all that the Constitution requires even against the
jurisdiction compelling testimony by granting immunity."
187
The Kastigar Court attempted to justify its decision by interpreting
the statute as being analogous to the fifth amendment requirements for
coerced confessions.188 The Court developed a procedure, which if read
into the statute, allowed immunized statements to be excluded in the
same way as coerced confessions. Thus, one could challenge evidence
and attempt to exclude it by showing that the defendant had testified
under a grant of immunity. By doing so, the defendant "shift[s] to the
government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it pro-
poses to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. '"189
Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that this, in effect, left the de-
fendant with no remedy.190 He reasoned that since the chain of evidence
was known only to the government, the government could meet its bur-
den by mere assertion as long as the witness-defendant had no contrary
evidence.1 91 He maintained, "[t]he Court today sets out a loose net to
trap tainted evidence and prevent its use against the witness, but it ac-
cepts an intolerably great risk that tainted evidence will in fact slip
through that net."192 Both Justice Marshall and Douglas, and Justice
Brennan as shown by his dissent in Piccirillo v. New York 193 believed this
was the form of "use" immunity Counselman invalidated and which
granted "far less than it had taken away." 194 Both Justices saw "use and
derivative use" immunity as unconstitutional because it was not coexten-
sive with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 95
However, use and derivative use immunity theoretically answers the
Court's concerns in Counselman by mandating that immunized testi-
mony is not to be used to uncover new evidence against a witness. Fur-
ther, use and derivative use immunity allows prosecution for a crime
187. Id. at 459 (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 461.
189. Id. at 461-62.
190. Id. at 467.
191. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. 406 U.S. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Strachen, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L. REV. 791
(1978); Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v.
United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350 (1973) (both criticizing Kastigar's less than transaction
immunity standard).
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using evidence the government has obtained independently before or af-
ter a witness' testimony.
2. Theories justifying immunity
One of two general theories, the gratuity theory or the exchange
theory, are used to justify immunity statutes. 196 Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent in United States v. Monia best represents the exchange theory. 97 In
Monia, the Court decided whether a person could benefit from an immu-
nity statute without invoking the fifth amendment before testifying. 198
The majority held that the statute automatically conferred immunity. 99
Frankfurter disagreed: "Duty, not privilege, lies at the core of this prob-
lem-the duty to testify, and not the privilege that relieves of such
duty.' '2z°  Since witnesses could refuse to testify under the fifth amend-
ment privilege,, Congress, to obtain testimony, had to make an exchange
for testimony which "'otherwise could not be got.' "201 Frankfurter
wrote that "when Congress turned to the devise of immunity legislation
... it did not provide a 'substitute' for the performance of the universal
duty to appear as a witness-it did not undertake to give something for
nothing. 2 02 To facilitate investigations, immunity is exchanged for the
privilege against self-incrimination. Since Counselman, the exchange
theory has been promoted by the view that to be valid, immunity grants
must be coextensive with the privilege replaced.
Frankfurter made his argument in response to the idea that Con-
gress had gratuitously passed immunity statutes as amnesties. 20 3 Under
the gratuity theory, immunity is granted without first examining what
triggers the grant. The majority in Monia found that testimony procured
from a subpoena to testify would immediately trigger immunity. 2° ' Vol-
untary testimony, accordingly, would not automatically produce immu-
nity.20 5 Therefore, immunity was gratuitously given to those summoned.
The gratuity theory, however, may also encompass the idea that immu-
nity is exchanged for testimony without invoking the privilege.
196. Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 447, 554, 560 (1954).
197. 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 425.
199. Id. at 430-31.
200. Id. at 432 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 433 (quoting Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 441.
204. Id. at 429.
205. Id.
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Assuming a summoned witness will invoke the privilege because the
testimony might implicate him in a crime, the only way the testimony
will be obtained is if immunity is granted. The right to invoke the privi-
lege is exchanged for an agreement that the testimony will not be used
against the witness. Only if witnesses would implicate themselves in
crimes, and not invoke the privilege, could the immunity be considered a
gratuity. Since self-incriminating testimony cannot be compelled, unless
immunity is granted, an immunity grant would only be "a gratuity to
crime '  when no compulsion is present and the incriminating testi-
mony would have been obtained without the grant of immunity. But
because of the ease with which the government can compel a witness to
testify through a grant of immunity, it cannot be assumed that a witness
would be willing to give testimony implicating himself in chargeable
crimes, if not protected by an immunity grant. Immunity is an exchange,
not a gift, which protects the witness and compels testimony.
3. Procedure to grant statutory immunity
Section 6003 of the immunity statute provides the mechanism
whereby immunity can be granted, and a witness' testimony compelled.
The statute mandates that:
[T]he United States District Court for the judicial district in
which the proceeding [where the testimony is desired] is or may
be held shall issue ... upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to
give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation .... 207
The request must be approved by "the Attorney General, the Dep-
uty Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General"
208
if (1) the information to be received is "necessary to the public interest";
and (2) the witness "has refused or is likely to refuse to testify.., on the
206. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913); see also McClellan, supra note 177, at
84.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1982).
208. Id. § 6003(b) (1982). The Justice Department promulgated regulations delegating ap-
proval power to Assistant Attorneys General in charge of certain divisions. They in turn are
authorized to redelegate their approval authority. The regulations, however, have a provision
that "no approval shall be granted unless the Criminal Division indicates that it has no objec-
tion to the proposed grant of immunity." 28 C.F.R. § 0.175-0.178 (1986); see also United
States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 947 (2d Cir. 1977) ("acting" Assistant Attorney General
authorized to approve immunity request). Further, the request need not be made by the
United States Attorney himself, but may be made by a delegate. In re Di Bella, 499 F.2d 1175,
1177 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 554 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1977).
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basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."20 9
Before a prosecutor seeks an immunity order from a court, several
steps have already been taken. Often there has been a proffer of evidence
concerning that which the witness will testify and a subsequent determi-
nation of the testimony's trustworthiness.21 0 After receiving the evi-
dence, a prosecutor must decide whether the evidence is so important to
an investigation or prosecution that the need for the evidence outweighs
society's desire to prosecute the witness. An Assistant United States At-
torney of the Criminal Division wrote:
Many factors are pertinent to making this decision including
the seriousness of the crime with respect to which the witness
will testify, the involvement and culpability, if any, of the wit-
ness in the crime, and the ability of the prosecutor to prosecute
the case without the testimony of the witness concerned. Addi-
tional factors include the ability of the prosecutor to prosecute
the witness for his criminal activity independent of the testi-
mony for which he is immunized, the likelihood that the wit-
ness will refuse to testify even if ordered to do so by the court,
and whether, if a witness does refuse to testify, there will be an
effective sanction against such contemptuous conduct. A con-
sideration of whether the witness' compelled testimony might
lead to unfortunate collateral consequences, such as physical
reprisals by a putative defendant, the likelihood that the wit-
ness will commit perjury, and the question of whether the pros-
ecutor could bring a prosecution against him if he did are also
elements of this determination. The value of the case at hand in
achieving an effective program of enforcing pertinent criminal
laws is a final important part of this "public interest"
inquiry.21
If these considerations convince the prosecutor that immunity is
within the public interest and if the witness is likely to refuse to testify
otherwise, the prosecution requests authorization from the Assistant At-
torney General, or his delegate, with responsibility for the subject matter
of the case to apply for an immunity order.21 2 Normal processing of
209. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(c)(1)(2) (1982).
210. Skimmer, Immunity, Right or Wrong? Right!, 57 CH. B. REc. 168, 172.
211. Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment:
"Criminal Coddling, " "The New Torture" or "'4 Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 158-59 (1976).
212. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Ju-
ries § 8.12(i), at 8-80 (1985) (quoting I U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, AUTHORIZATION PROCE-
DURES §§ 1-121.100-1-11.130 (1977)) [hereinafter FEDERAL GRAND JURIES].
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such requests takes two weeks, though emergency authorization deci-
sions can sometimes be made by phone or teletype in one to three
days. I3 Approval by form letter is usually automatic, with few, if any,
standards maintained for reviewing immunity requests.214 After Justice
Department approval is received, the United States Attorney files a peti-
tion before a district judge in the jurisdiction of the investigation.215
Upon filing the request for the immunity order, the judge's role is
largely ministerial. Despite arguments that the judges should determine
the propriety of granting immunity orders and inquire as to possible
overreaching by prosecutors or other constitutional violations,216 if the
order is properly requested the court has little discretion to deny it.217 A
judge may not review facts supporting the United States Attorney's deci-
sion that a grant of immunity is within the public interest, because, "that
judgment is entirely a matter for the executive branch. 2 18 Further, the
court need not specify or limit the questions which may be asked, con-'
trary to the previous situation under transactional immunity statutes.2 19
When a United States Attorney refused to indicate the subject matter, at
least one court has denied issuance of the immunity grant.220 The wit-
ness to whom immunity is being granted need not be notified of an im-
munity request hearing221 or be given an opportunity to be heard.
22 2
Those judges, like the Department of Justice officials approving the im-
munity request, act as a rubber stamp of the prosecutor's decision to
grant immunity. As has been said, "[i]n effect the judge is being asked to
sign an order affecting basic rights without being given an opportunity to
exercise judicial discretion. 22 3 This process may be bureaucratic, but a
United States Attorney can effectively compel testimony through this
process. During the first five years of its enactment, the immunity statute
213. Id. at 8-81.
214. Wolfson, Immunity--How It Works in Real Life, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167,
167 (1976).
215. Id. at 168.
216. See, e.g., FEDERAL GRAND JURIES, supra note 212, at § 8.12(c), 8-70-71; Skimmer,
supra note 210 at 178-79; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 657 F.2d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1981).
217. See FEDERAL GRAND JURIES, supra note 212, § 8.12(c), at 8-69.
218. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1977).
219. FEDERAL GRAND JURIES, supra note 212, at § 8.12(c), 8-75; United States v. Leyva,
513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1975); Ryan, 568 F.2d at 541.
220. In re Parkin, No. Mo-88 (W.D. Wis., Feb. 23, 1973), reported in FEDERAL GRAND
JURIES, supra note 212, § 812(c), at 8-875.
221. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 657 F.2d at 91 (lack of notice does not violate due
process because immunity is not property right).
222. United States v. Pacella, 622 F.2d 640, 643 (2d Cir. 1980) (exparte grant of immunity
approved as long as government followed statutory procedures).
223. Wolfson, supra note 214, at 168.
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was used to obtain authority to immunize over 15,000 witnesses.224 The
process may be used by prosecutors to immunize prospective wit-
nesses.225 Once immunized, witnesses will be held in contempt for refus-.
ing to answer questions when appearing before the investigative body.226
The ease with which prosecutors can overcome the privilege against
self-incrimination is an important background to consider when examin-
ing a person's decision to agree to informal immunity. Since a potential
witness can easily be compelled to testify, it cannot be assumed that a
grant of informal immunity is an uncompelled or voluntary agreement.
Both prosecutors and witnesses may find it to be a shortcut to a place
they would end up in any case-the witness giving testimony. The short-
cut, in turn, minimizes the alienation and maximizes the cooperation on
each side. The witness' choice to enter into that agreement, however, is
compelled in the same manner section 6002 compels testimony once im-
munity is granted.
IV. INFORMAL IMMUNITY
A. Introduction
There are two general situations in which informal immunity227 can
arise. The first one involves an ongoing investigation of criminal activity.
There, the government may have discovered the existence of a culpable
witness. The testimony of that witness would either facilitate the investi-
gation or provide evidence leading to another suspect's indictment or
conviction. Naturally, the government seeks to obtain the witness' testi-
mony. However, the fifth amendment prohibits the government from
compelling such testimony because it would be incriminating. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the government could easily get a statu-
tory grant of immunity to compel the witness to testify.228 Yet, the
government also wants the cooperation of the witness in the investiga-
tion. This goal of cooperation makes the government willing to fashion
an agreement whereby a witness discloses to the government, and to the
grand jury if necessary, information to which he is privy, in exchange for
nonprosecution. A witness may also agree to plead guilty to a lesser of-
fense in exchange for the promise that what he says will not be used
224. Id. at 169.
225. FEDERAL GRAND JURIES, supra note 212, § 8.12(f), at 8-76.
226. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
227. There are many different names and forms for informal immunity. Among them are
"pocket immunity," "hip-pocket immunity," "nonstatutory immunity," and letters of assur-
ances. This Article uses the term informal immunity because of the laxness it connotes.
228. See supra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
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against him. Often such agreements will include any or all combinations
of these promises. Such agreements may also include promises on the
witness' part to cooperate in some special way with the government, by
the witness' counsel or by the witness himself.
The second situation in which informal immunity is often granted is
where an informant who has been involved with some criminal activity
decides to go to law enforcement to "turn state's evidence." The reasons
an informant might do this are numerous. He might have been betrayed
by other members of the criminal activities, he might be searching for
protection from dangerous one-time partners, he might be trying to get
out of a criminal lifestyle and wipe his slate clean, or he might think an
investigation that will discover him is pending and he is trying to mini-
mize his criminal liability. The second scenario differs from the first be-
cause here the informant is giving the government information about
himself and others about which the government would not otherwise
know. In doing so, he asks, in exchange from the government, either
nonprosecution, little or no prison time for his crimes and/or the prom-
ise that what he says will not be used against him. Depending on how
much his information is worth to the government, and how much he
demands for it, the government may also add conditions to its promises
which minimize the informant's criminal liability. This bargaining is dif-
ferent from that which takes place when the government already knows
of the activity, for in that situation the government already has some-
thing on the informant-witness 229 and, thus, has more cards with which
to bargain.
There is much confusion in the cases as to whether these situations
and agreements, in fact, immunize the information given. Because plea
bargains and agreements of nonprosecution are often included when in-
formal immunity agreements are made, courts often analyze the entire
package without being concerned with the fifth amendment values impli-
cated by the immunity part of the agreement. Informal immunity is
distinguishable from plea bargaining and agreements of nonprosecution
in that the fifth amendment privilege of not being compelled to disclose
self-incriminatory information is overridden by the government when
immunity is granted. Immunity occurs only at those times the privilege
is triggered-when self-incriminatory information is provided to the gov-
ernment-which, but for an agreement or understanding that it would
229. This section of the Article will use the term "informant-witness" to indicate the differ-
ent roles played by those given informal immunity. When the Article uses one of the words of
the term alone, or uses the word "defendant," it is to indicate the predominant role of the
information-giver in the particular situation under discussion.
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not be used against the informant-witness, the government would not
have obtained in the first place.
The nonstatutory method of promising immunity makes the immu-
nity grant informal, while the self-incriminating nature of the informa-
tion produced by the promise of immunity mandates the immunity
analysis. Because informal immunity agreements are based on the infor-
mation produced, the nonprosecution agreements included in them pro-
vide immunity to the extent that the information provided by the
informant might otherwise be used against the informant. Similarly, in
the plea bargaining context, the immunity analysis is relevant to the ex-
tent that the government directly or derivatively receives incriminating
evidence. 230 Agreements of nonprosecution and plea bargains may in-
volve informal immunity, but if no self-incriminatory information or tes-
timony is provided in reliance on such agreements, there is no need for
constitutional immunity analysis to protect the values behind the fifth
amendment.
Informal immunity differs from statutory immunity only in the
manner in which it is conferred.231 When a prosecutor confers informal
immunity, he need not obtain approval from the Attorney General or
from other officials designated by Congress in section 6003.232 Further,
no approval-automatic or otherwise-is required by a supervising
court. In effect, an informal immunity grant is the shortcutting of what
is already an almost automatic process of conferring immunity on a wit-
ness in order to compel incriminatory testimony. Consequently, infor-
mal immunity involves even more discretion reposed in the prosecuting
attorney than is the case with statutory immunity because the institu-
tional mechanisms which insure that the initial grant of immunity is
within the public interest are absent.
. Legitimacy of Informal Immunity
The power of a prosecutor to grant a witness informal immunity is
often defended as a necessary outgrowth of the general powers and dis-
cretion prosecutors generally have over cases. The decision of how and
to whom immunity is granted has been said to be vested solely in the
230. The plea itself may be considered incriminating, but sixth amendment jurisprudence,
which explicitly deals with problems of improper pleas, allows the entire plea to be withdrawn
and permanently excluded from being used against a defendant. Comment, Judicial Supervi-
sion of Non-Statutory Immunity, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334, 335-37, 336 n.ll
(1974).
231. For an overview of the method whereby statutory immunity is granted, see supra notes
207-26 and accompanying text.
232. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
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executive branch of the government because it has the sole discretion as
to whether to prosecute a case.233 Supposedly within this broad
prosecutorial discretion is the power to make informal agreements with
witnesses.234 The power to grant immunity from prosecution, on the the-
ory that prosecutors can make decisions not to prosecute in the first
place, falls into this discretionary area as well.235 This follows to the
extent that the greater power to abstain from prosecuting infers the lesser
power to only partially prosecute or even to condition an agreement not
to prosecute. However, the discretion a prosecutor has to not initiate a
prosecution is theoretically different from a prosecutor's discretion to
confer immunity on an informant-witness in exchange for self-incrimina-
tory information.
For a variety of reasons, a prosecutor can decide not to prosecute a
crime. For instance, the social costs of a crime may not outweigh the
costs of prosecuting the criminal. The suspect may have already been
punished by community disgrace and may have reimbursed his victim, so
that prosecution for the crime would serve little purpose. On the other
hand, a government attorney may selectively decide to prosecute a sus-
pect because of the deterrent effect such a prosecution would have on
other criminal activity. Prosecution for a minor crime can be cost-effec-
tive when it serves as a general deterrent.
236
Placing the discretion to prosecute in a local government attorney's
hand gives needed flexibility. The different criteria for deciding whether
a prosecution would be feasible and serve justice may be weighed by a
local government attorney without going through the impersonal and in-
flexible bureaucracy of an institution like the Justice Department. Fur-
ther, the prosecutor is the person who best knows the resources that can
be used for a case and the potential for its success. Giving a prosecutor
the discretion not to prosecute, or to accept a plea lesser than the maxi-
mum potential verdict, allows for the most effective allocation of law en-
forcement resources while also permitting justice to be served.2 37
These different variables also go into a prosecutor's decision of
whether, and to whom, immunity should be granted. As stated previ-
ously, a prosecutor weighs many factors before he applies to the Justice
Department for statutory immunity. Among these factors are culpability
233. United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1976).
234. United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 45 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
235. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
236. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S.
CAL. L. REv. 519 (1969) (criteria for decisions of initiating prosecutions).
237. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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of the witness, the information to which he might testify, the potential
for a successful prosecution of the offense and the importance of convict-
ing other suspects in the criminal activity.238 There is an additional fac-
tor as well: for the promise of informal immunity the witness reveals
information he would not have had to reveal because of the constitu-
tional right not to incriminate himself. Once the informant-witness gives
incriminatory information, law enforcement is prohibited from using the
information only to the extent that the promise is enforced.
The analytical difference between a decision not to prosecute and
the granting of informal immunity is twofold. When a prosecutor de-
cides not to prosecute, he is deciding not to do something. The granting
of informal immunity is an affirmative action. It is the difference be-
tween giving someone a shield and not shooting someone. While it is
clear that a prosecutor's power includes the power to abstain from prose-
cution,2 39 it is not clear whether the office of prosecutor is vested with the
power to grant immunity on its own.2' The second difference involves
the potential irreparable injury which an informant-witness subjects him-
self when he gives information relying on an informal immunity agree-
ment. If a prosecutor does not prosecute, the informant-witness has
forfeited nothing. However, after the incriminating information is pro-
vided to the government, only the prosecutor's promise prevents its use
against him. The promise is a shield only as long as it is kept. If the
promise is not kept, the informant-witness is particularly vulnerable. He
needs a positive action, the immunity grant, to provide the inviolability
of a shield.
There may be reasons, however, to give prosecutors the power to
grant immunity. It has by now been well established that there are pol-
icy reasons to give prosecutors the affirmative power to bargain for and
accept pleas of guilty to lesser crimes than a prosecutor might otherwise
charge. This is defended as a matter of judicial and law enforcement
238. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
239. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Librach, 536 F.2d at 1230.
240. See Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878) (prosecutor can recommend a "pardon");
United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.
1987). This case was reversed after the body of this Article was written. The court of appeals
held the prosecutorial conduct not to be so bad as to be a constitutional violation and not to
have substantially effected the indictments which the district court found faulty. 821 F.2d at
1465. The circuit court also held that the "defendant's [had] failed to show how the use of
informal immunity prejudiced the grand jury." Id. at 1470. The court found nothing im-
proper with the use of informal immunity. Id.; see also United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp.
846 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no authority to grant immunity). With respect to the states, see Bowie v.
State, 14 Md. App. 567, 575, 287 A.2d 782, 787 (1972) ("immunity is exclusively a creation of
statute").
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efficiency.24 It is also assumed that a local prosecutor familiar with a
case often does a good job of judging the defendant, specifically the need
for society to punish him and to what extent.242
It is arguably within the public interest to acknowledge, or to grant,
prosecutors the ability to make immunity agreements. Presently, as de-
scribed above, prosecutors in the federal system use the statutory method
prescribed in sections 6002 to 6005, while most state prosecutors have
statutes providing the power to grant immunity in certain circumstances.
However, these statutes may not give prosecutors the same amount of
flexibility as informal immunity agreements provide. Further, the insti-
tutional system of approval might hinder prosecutors in fashioning such
individual and flexible agreements.243 If local prosecutors indeed do
need flexibility and individual discretion in forming agreements, four fac-
tors must be determined: (1) whether the current statutory immunity
system prevents certain information from being given to law enforcement
because it prohibits needed flexibility; (2) whether the current statutory
scheme can be interpreted to permit such flexibility; (3) whether new im-
munity laws enabling prosecutors to enter into flexible immunity agree-
ments are needed; and (4) whether such changes would be beneficial to
society.
The current statutory immunity regime gives prosecutors nearly un-
limited discretion. Immunity can be obtained for almost any witness.
The Justice Department and the courts serve as little more than rubber
stamps for the local prosecutor's decisions.244 However, statutes such as
the current federal immunity statute do not anticipate a prosecutor and
informant bargaining for immunity. The model for federal immunity en-
visions a witness that is already discovered and called to testify before a
grand jury or legislative body. The witness is given immunity either after
he has refused to testify, through asserting his fifth amendment privilege,
or if the prosecutor has reason to believe he will refuse to testify. Immu-
nity is conferred to 'compel testimony.
Informal immunity often arises from circumstances where the gov-
ernment is trying to get much more than mere testimony. The govern-
ment is trying to obtain information and even cooperation so that
suspects in a crime may be caught and tried. In such a situation, law
241. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61 (1971).
242. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 53-54
(1968).
243. See supra notes 207-26 which illustrate that approval by the Justice Department is a
matter of course which does not infringe on a prosecutor's decision to grant immunity. The
immunity provided is often not tailored to an individual's need; it is usually a form letter.
244. See supra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
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enforcement officials may find that they need to give something to the
informant-witness in exchange for information. This is the promise that
what the informant-witness says will not be used against him or that the
informant-witness will receive little or no punishment for an acknowl-
edged crime. Sometimes it is both. Often, however, the government
wants to condition immunity on the cooperation of the informant-wit-
ness in the investigation. The purpose of such a condition is to prevent
the informant-witness from deserting law enforcement officials in the
middle of an investigation, while allowing him to avoid liability for his
disclosed crimes.
It would be simple to allow flexible immunity agreements where im-
munity can be conditioned on either the government or informant-wit-
ness, or both, meeting certain conditions. The easiest change would be
legislative; the immunity statute would be amended to reflect the need for
flexibility. In making such an amendment, the legislature would have to
determine what degree of discretion for making conditional agreements
should be in the hands of the prosecutor. Further, the question of court
and executive branch supervision would have to be addressed: since such
agreements would be more sophisticated than mere conferrals of immu-
nity, they would presumably trigger a more complicated response than
the current usual form letter approval of immunity. Each agreement of
immunity would be individually tailored to the particular situation. Su-
pervision of prosecutors in this task will be explored more fully later in
this Article. 45
A legislative response is mandated because the current use of infor-
mal immunity is of dubious legality. In the Whiskey Cases,46 the
Supreme Court held that prosecutors have no authority to enter into lia-
bility limiting agreements with culpable accomplices in exchange for tes-
timony against other suspects.247 However, this case was decided on the
basis of an alternative analysis, equitable immunity.24 The case held
that there was no right to a stay of execution so a pardon could be re-
quested from the executive branch, allowing the government to live up to
its promise of immunity.249 However, the Court in Santobello v. New
York,2 50 held that plea agreements must be kept. Most federal courts
245. See infra notes 320-40 and accompanying text.
246. 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
247. Id. at 606.
248. Equitable immunity was an ancient judicial concept where an accomplice in a crime
would not be prosecuted for the same offense if he testified against his partners in crime for the
same offense. Id. at 595.
249. Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 599.
250. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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have enforced immunity agreements against the government. 251 This en-
forcement renders questionable the validity of the holding in the Whiskey
Cases.252
Further, because the federal statute provides that prosecutors must
obtain Justice Department permission and judicial action to grant immu-
nity to a witness, it has been argued that any other grant of immunity is
illegal.25 3 Judge Kane of the United States District Court of Colorado
has written that informal immunity violates statutes and taints with ille-
gality indictments obtained through informal immunity. 4 In his view,
[it] can be seen most clearly that Congress has vested exclusive
authority to grant immunities in a few specified officials in the
Department of Justice. Further, Congress has clearly and une-
quivocably set forth the parameters within which that discre-
tion must be exercised. Ordinary statutory construction
employing the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
.. leads to only one conclusion: Pocket [informal] immunity
is illegal; when granting immunity, the Department of Justice
must comply with the requirements of sections 6002 and
6003.255
Some state courts have limited the right of a prosecutor to grant
immunity for the same reasons. In Bowie v. Maryland,256 the defendant
alleged he was promised immunity by the prosecutors. The state appel-
late court held that:
Immunity, in the first place, could never be granted to the
appellant by anyone in the circumstances of this case. There is
no inherent, common law power in the State's Attorney or in
the Grand Jury or in the judge or in anyone else to confer im-
munity from prosecution. Immunity is exclusively a creation of
statute and can only exist where a statute has brought it into
being.
2 5 7
In California, a district attorney has no right to grant immunity ex-
cept through statute.258 Moreover, the statute requires court approval
251. See infra notes 278-401 and accompanying text.
252. United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D.D.C. 1969).
253. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. at 1349.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) ("immunity is a
statutory creation").
256. 14 Md. App. 567, 287 A.2d 782 (1972).
257. Id. at 575, 287 A.2d at 787.
258. People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973).
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for a grant of immunity.25 9 According to the court of appeal in People v.
Brunner :260
[A] witness may be so influenced by his hopes and fears that he
will promise to testify to anything desired by the prosecution in
order to obtain a grant of immunity. Because the satisfaction of
the prosecutor is the witness's [sic] ticket to freedom, the prose-
cutor, by dangling the promise of immunity, can put the words
he wishes into the witness's mouth. This danger is especially
grave when the witness knows he is expected to give particular
testimony, absent which he will not receive the promised
immunity.
26 1
Therefore, the court asserted that the state immunity statute
[p]roperly used . . . protects the witness against prosecution
pressure to color existing or create additional testimony in or-
der to obtain previously promised immunity. [It] establishes a
procedure under which the bargain between prosecutor and
witness, each to perform certain acts in the future, can be made
a matter of record so that dishonesty, equivocation, and misun-
derstanding may be minimized. 6z
Although the current federal immunity statute does not explicitly pro-
vide supervision which would protect a witness against such overbear-
ing,263 the statute provides a witness protection insofar as a prosecutor
must answer to others for his actions before incriminatory information is
revealed. The statutory mandate that federal courts must issue, or pre-
sumably can deny the issuance of, immunity also serves as a bulwark
against such overbearing.264 Without such protections, informal immu-
nity grants are in conflict with, and therefore precluded by, the immunity
statute. Only legislative action can permit grants of immunity without
259. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (West 1970).
260. 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973).
261. Id. at 913-14, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
262. Id. at 914, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
263. Whether immunity statutes in general should include provisions whereby there would
be supervision over individual prosecutors' potential overbearing, or if the current constitu-
tional law logically extends so far, is discussed at infra notes 320.40 and accompanying text.
That the Justice Department must approve all statutory immunity grants and a judge must
issue them insulates an informant-witness from being completely at the mercy of a local
prosecutor.
264. The commission proposing the federal immunity statute specifically suggested that the
language of the statute was designed to reserve to the judiciary the "inherent power" to deny
immunity requests. 2 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
WORKING PAPERS, 1435-36 (1970) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; see also Note, Federal
Witness Immunity Problems And Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 275, 296-97 (1976).
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the current federal requirement of the Justice Department's and courts'
supervision. Such legislation can and should minimize the impact of
such unsupervised discretion. However, this would not be possible with
unsupervised informal immunity.
Judge Kane has pointed out another problem with informal immu-
nity with respect to the federal system. He wrote:
The procedure [for statutory immunity] leaves no doubt the ac-
complishment of the grant, the particularized need of the wit-
ness and the scope of immunity. . . . Informal immunity,
apparently in widespread use by the Justice Department, ac-
complishes none of those goals. It is a damnable practice. No
notice need be given to senior Justice Department officials or to
a judge. The only record, if any, is a letter by the U.S. Attorney
or a transcript of an oral representation, if it was made on the
record. Such informality has resulted in confusion over wit-
nesses rights in the past .... While the immunity grant is
always a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the procedures of
§§ 6002 and 6003 subject it to the light of public, congressional
and judicial scrutiny and insure that it is not invoked or re-
voked arbitrarily or capriciously.
265
The arguments that informal immunity is illegal because it is pre-
empted by the statutes providing for certain procedures for immunity,
and that it is inherently dangerous, are persuasive. However, if a need
existed for the flexibility of informal immunity, Congress, or state legisla-
tures, could pass general enabling statutes empowering prosecutors to
make immunity agreements with informant-witnesses. Only with such
legislative action could prosecutors legitimately have the power to confer
immunity on informant-witnesses and fashion mutually beneficial agree-
ments without going through bureaucratic channels. This may be desira-
ble if the bureaucratic channels and the current statutory methods of
granting immunity were, in fact, inadequate. Further, it would have to
be shown that any abuses inherent in allowing such discretion by prose-
cutors could be minimized, while maximizing judicial and law enforce-
ment efficiency.
Current federal statutory immunity methods permit a great deal of
discretion in the local prosecutor. As discussed earlier, local prosecutors
must do little more than ask their superiors in the Department of Justice
before immunity can be granted. Once this approval is given, a judge is
265. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. at 1348 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 223,
233 (D. Wyo. 1983)).
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practically powerless to deny a request for immunity. 266A prosecutor's
discretion as to whom to grant immunity is not hindered by the federal
immunity regime. The fact that negotiations with an informant-witness
often occur when there are time restraints is no problem under the cur-
rent federal statute since Justice Department approval can be obtained
within a day.
2 67
The question is whether the current regime permits enough flexibil-
ity to make deals with informant-witnesses. If an informant comes to a
prosecutor's office and proffers that he has self-incriminatory informa-
tion, but refuses to give it unless given the promise that the information
he gave will not be used against him, the prosecutor needs the power to
fashion a deal whereby the informant-witness is assured that his informa-
tion will not be used against him. The prosecutor could compel the dis-
closure of this information by providing the informant-witness with
statutory immunity. However, the prosecutor might have no knowledge
of the criminal activity to investigate, and about which he is attempting
to compel testimony, unless given more information voluntarily.
Further, the information might lead to an investigation in which the
informant's cooperation is necessary. Information about the criminal ac-
tivity would be forthcoming if the prosecutor could condition the grant
of immunity on the witness' continued cooperation. Each side may also
want other assurances so that the deal becomes more than the simple
grant of immunity for testimony in front of a court or grand jury envi-
sioned by the immunity statute, but rather a sophisticated contract. For
instance, the informant-witness may want to avoid a prison term, he may
desire protection from reprisals from those against whom he is going to
testify or he may even want government support while he is cooperating
with them. The government, on the other hand, may want the inform-
ant-witness to take a polygraph, help arrange the arrest of, and gather
evidence against, suspects. It may want assurances that the informant
will indeed testify in open court or before a grand jury. Thus, the gov-
ernment and informant-witness may negotiate for what in the end be-
comes a contract with interlocking and binding conditions.
The federal immunity statute is not geared to such agreements,
although it might be interpreted to allow them.268 The statute compels a
266. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
267. Id.
268. In the report accompanying the federal immunity statute, informal immunity is men-
tioned as a legitimate alternative to statutory immunity. However, the committee's analysis
only discusses informal immunity agreements in which a prosecutor promises not to prosecute
for crimes disclosed in exchange for cooperation. It does not touch on the more difficult ques-
tion of whether the statute would allow the government to fashion an agreement with the
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witness who is called before a court, grand jury or legislative body to
testify. It provides for the granting of immunity in exchange for relin-
quishment of the fifth amendment privilege. However, it has no provi-
sions for immunity to be exchanged for witnesses' information given in
the course of an investigation or for such immunity to be conditional.
The statute addresses only immunity for testimony or information pro-
vided "at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States." '69 The exchange of informa-
tion and cooperation needed for an investigation are, therefore, not cov-
ered by the statute. Further, the statute's discussion of approving a grant
of immunity implies that only an affirmative grant of immunity is envi-
sioned by the statute. The complicated conditional agreements, involv-
ing cooperation and plea agreements, which are the ingredients of
informal immunity agreements, are not covered by the statute. The auto-
matic method of approval of statutory immunity by the Department of
Justice270 further supports the notion that the statute only permits a lim-
ited form of immunity: a grant that what one says in a judicial or legisla-
tive proceeding will not be used against one. This is an unconditional
grant, except that the testimony must be true.2 7' Moreover, there are no
mechanisms for reviewing the various forms of informal immunity agree-
ments with their multiple conditions and different articulations.
Prosecutors, however, need the flexibility that they achieve by infor-
mal immunity agreements. Such agreements serve as an adjunct to the
power a prosecutor has to make plea bargains. In order for the resources
of a prosecutor's office to achieve the most efficient law enforcement re-
sult, the prosecutor must have the power to enter into complicated settle-
ments the same way prosecutor's civil analogues, civil lawyers, do.272 In
addition to accepting lesser pleas when it seems preferable, prosecutors
must be able to induce witnesses to testify freely and fully about criminal
activity of which they are aware and in which they are implicated. Only
a deal which covers all the variables in the testimony and information-
giving process can fully protect both sides, so that both sides are willing
to trust each other and the information can be obtained.
In addition, law enforcement officials must have assurances that in-
formation provided is reliable and continues until an investigation has
informant-witness, as opposed to just compelling his self-incriminatory testimony. WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 264, at 1419-20.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1982).
270. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
272. The Supreme Court has called plea bargaining "an essential component of the admin-
istration of justice" which is to be "encouraged." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
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been completed. Incorporating a condition into an agreement that the
information provided will not be used against the provider as long as the
information is true and continues throughout the investigation will pro-
vide such needed assurances. Such an agreement also ensures that the
information provided will not be used against the provider, but only if
the informant in fact testifies before a grand jury and maybe later at trial.
The agreement can assure the informant that he will be protected while
giving information, face a minimal charge, and that the information he
supplied will not be used against him. The intertwining of all the condi-
tions, on the prosecution's part as well as the informant's part, produces
the needed information. The entire deal has to be protected as an inte-
gral whole, not piecemeal. Section 6002 has no provision for such inte-
grated immunity agreements.273
The limitations of the federal immunity statute probably caused the
development of informal immunity.2 74 Law enforcement needed the tes-
timony, and just as importantly, the information from culpable infor-
mants. Informants, on the other hand, would not give this information
unless given certain assurances. However, the immunity statute did not
provide for these assurances. Consequently, prosecutors had to make
promises on their own which they had no authority to make. Since the
information provided by informants serves an important role in federal
prosecutions, federal judges often abide by the agreements made between
informants and prosecutors. But problems have arisen since there are no
standards by which to judge and enforce these agreements, nor standards
by which to clarify the meaning of the elements of the individual
agreements.275
In effect, law enforcement policy may dictate the need for the more
flexible immunity agreements which the federal immunity statute seems
to preempt. The language of the federal immunity statute might be
stretched so that judges could allow prosecutors to have flexibility in
making immunity agreements. Such an interpretation might consider
Congress' intent in passing the statute generally to enable law enforce-
ment to obtain information from the culpable. Arguably, Congress
passed the statute to further this goal. The specificity of approval, ac-
cording to the argument, was not meant to limit prosecutors. If flexible
agreements further this goal, they should be allowed.
The problem with this argument, of course, is that it flies in the face
of the statute. The statute very specifically provides for methods
273. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
274. Quatermain, 613 F.2d at 45.
275. See generally id. at 46-47.
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whereby immunity is conferred. To permit a method other than that
dictated by Congress would be to ignore the statute. Congress' method
of approval serves the purposes of limiting, at least theoretically, the dis-
cretion of local prosecutors, while providing for a central supervisory and
record-keeping institution in the Department of Justice.27 6 The statute
also limits the delegability of approving immunity grants. This, accord-
ing to the report accompanying the proposed statute, "serves to highlight
the social cost in immunity grants and minimize the possibility of abuse
through overly broad subdelegations by the Attorney General. 2 77 These
provisions militate against the interpretation that the federal immunity
statute includes the broader power for prosecutors to make flexible infor-
mal immunity agreements. Only legislative action can provide for the
needed flexibility of informal immunity.
V. PROBLEMS OF INFORMAL IMMUNITY
Since the above analysis suggests that the flexibility of informal im-
munity agreements is desirable, and since only new legislative action can
permit such agreements, the question is what such legislation should look
like. Before proposing legislation, we must examine the cases in which
informal immunity agrbements were at issue. These cases present the
problems at issue when flexible immunity agreements are entered into
between prosecutors and informant-witnesses. Any proposed legislation
must address these issues. These issues include: (1) whether a prosecu-
tor's promise is enforceable in jurisdictions other than his own;
(2) whether he can promise more than use and derivative use immunity;
(3) whether such immunity agreements are voluntary; (4) whether an in-
formant-witness needs to be informed of constitutional rights before en-
tering into the agreement; and (5) whether representation by counsel is
necessary. Also important are recordation of the agreements, judicial or
Department of Justice approval of agreements, interpretation of agree-
ments and appropriate remedies for breaches of agreements.
A. Jurisdictional Limitations
Because informal immunity arises from a promise that is theoreti-
cally implicit in prosecutorial discretion, the jurisdictional extent of the
promise is often in question. In one case, United States v. Carter,2 78 a
defendant challenged a federal conspiracy conviction in Virginia on the
276. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 264, at 1434-35.
277. Id. at 1437.
278. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
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basis that he was promised immunity for his cooperation by the Assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA) for the District of Columbia. The court
held that if the government made the agreement, and the defendant re-
lied on it, the government must abide by it. 279 The court reasoned:
Many federal crimes have multistate ramifications and are com-
mitted by persons acting in concert. If we hypothesize a single
defendant charged with the interstate transportation of a stolen
motor vehicle through several states, we would not question
that the efficient administration of justice would support the au-
thority of the prosecutor in one of those states to obtain an in-
dictment and bargain for a guilty plea, agreeing that all offenses
in the other jurisdictions would be disposed of in the single
case.
280
The court relied on another case, United States v. Paiva,28 1 in which
the defendant made a plea agreement with the AUSA, and after plead-
ing, the Secret Service proceeded with a separate complaint based on the
same transactions and information provided by the defendant. The Paiva
court held that:
[I]f, after having utilized its discretion to strike bargains with
potential defendants, the Government seeks to avoid those ar-
rangements by using the courts, its decision to do so will come
under scrutiny. If it further appears that the defendant, to his
prejudice, performed his part of the agreement while the Gov-
ernment did not, the indictment may be dismissed.28 2
Both Carter and Paiva may be limited by the fact that it was the United
States, although different divisions of the United States, that initiated the
prosecutions. The Carter court wrote:
The United States government is the United States government
throughout all of the states and districts. If the United States
government in the District of Columbia, acting through one of
its apparently authorized agents, promised that the sole prose-
cution against [a] defendant would be the misdemeanor charge
in that jurisdiction, and the defendant relied on the promise to
his prejudice ... we will not permit the United States govern-
ment in the Eastern District of Virginia to breach the
283promise.
279. Id. at 427-28.
280. Id. at 428.
281. 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
282. Id. at 747.
283. Carter, 454 F.2d at 428.
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No case has yet tackled the problem of whether informal immunity
agreements are enforceable as between states and the federal prosecuting
agencies. However, logic dictates that such agreements must be recipro-
cal, at least to the minimal extent mandated by the fifth amendment.
The ruling in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor284
stands for the proposition that if a state or federal jurisdiction grants
immunity to a witness, the other jurisdiction cannot use the testimony or
the fruits of the testimony against the witness.28 Similarly, if one juris-
diction informally grants immunity, other states or the federal govern-
ment cannot use the testimony thus obtained against the witness. The
holdings in Murphy, Paiva and Carter all suggest this result. However,
Murphy limits this result. It is only the constitutional minimum use and
derivative use of the immunized information that cannot be used by the
other jurisdiction.
It is not clear whether an informal immunity agreement which pro-
vides more than the fifth amendment's requirement of use and derivative
use immunity can bind prosecutors in other jurisdictions.286 The holding
in Murphy suggests that other jurisdictions would have to respect the
immunity only to the extent it replaces the fifth amendment privilege.287
Accordingly, they would not be able to use the testimony against the
informant-witness. However, if the informant-witness relied on a trans-
actional immunity agreement which he thought would be binding in -all
jurisdictions, it may be argued that it would be unfair to allow other
jurisdictions to prosecute him. This would be true even if the evidence
used was not derived from his immunized information. Promises made
by the government, should be kept. In the informant's mind there is no
distinction between jurisdictions. Such prosecutions might hinder prose-
cutors from obtaining information through immunity agreements if in-
formants know of other prosecutions in which informants did not get the
benefit of the bargains for which they negotiated because other jurisdic-
284. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
'285. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
286. This Article later argues that informal immunity agreements should be enforceable
even if they provide more immunity than the constitutional minimum requirement of use and
derivative use immunity. As a result, a prosecutor might agree to give transactional immunity
for an informant-witness' information.
287. The result in Murphy is dictated by our federal system of courts. The analysis of this
Article focuses on a federal immunity grant. However, to the extent an immunity grant may
create information a state might want to use, the analysis is applicable to a state's use of the
information or a grant of immunity made by a state also. The nongranting jurisdiction is
compelled to respect the constitutional minimum use and derivative use immunity which sup-
plants the fifth amendment.
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tions did not respect them. The informant might think that the informa-
tion supplied is surreptiously shared among jurisdictions.
If the law was clear that only use immunity was obtained through
such informal agreements, it would be unreasonable to think that agree-
ments providing transactional immunity in one jurisdiction would be en-
forced to the same extent in other jurisdictions. Therefore, testimony
given in reliance on informal immunity agreements which provide trans-
actional immunity in a federal jurisdiction could be used in the prosecu-
tion of the same crimes in a state's jurisdiction, as long as the informant-
witness was aware of this fact. This awareness could be assured by in-
forming the informant-witness of the limitation of the agreement, or by
supplying him with an attorney before making the agreement. Knowing
that an immunity agreement only provides transactional immunity where
it was granted, and only use immunity in other jurisdictions, an inform-
ant-witness could enter into an agreement with full knowledge of its con-
sequences. His waiver of his fifth amendment privilege would be
voluntary and his rights protected. He might still have the incentive to
give information because the agreement would prohibit the federal gov-
ernment from charging him for a crime and the state from using his testi-
mony against him.288
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The general theory of prosecutional misconduct raises a series of
problems connected with informal immunity agreements. The current
practice of informal immunity gives local prosecutors a great deal of dis-
cretion. In their zeal to obtain convictions of certain criminals, prosecu-
tors, unbridled by the constraints of statutory or constitutional
protections, may ignore the rights of the informant-witnesses or larger
law enforcement policies of the government. Misconduct may stem from
forces such as political ambitions or political pressure. Statutory immu-
nity also presents similar problems because a local prosecutor's discre-
tion is generally approved by the Department of Justice and courts have,
little choice but to approve grants of immunity.289 However, these
problems are more pronounced when a complete lack of external control
exists, as in the case of informal immunity. Under this practice, a prose-
cutor could even make an arguably binding agreement against the public
interest and violate the constitutional rights of the informant-witness.
288. See infra notes 346-72 and accompanying text for further discussions of these
protections.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 207-23; see also Note, supra note 264, at 292-97.
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In United States v. Kilpatrick,29 District Judge Kane dismissed con-
spiracy and fraud indictments, in part because of the use of informal im-
munity.2 9' Under a totality of circumstances test, the use of informal
immunity, along with other improprieties, showed prosecutorial miscon-
duct. 92 In his opinion, Judge Kane discussed many of the gray areas
that prosecutors use to their advantage in the formation of informal im-
munity agreements. Judge Kane condemned the prosecutors for "in-
ject[ing] serious ambiguity in the critical areas of witness credibility"
through "their deliberate efforts to avoid the review process and the cer-
tainty that Congress intended in the granting of witness immunity."' 93
Some witnesses who testified before the grand jury in accordance with
their informal immunity grants were told that the immunity replaced
their fifth amendment privilege, while others were allowed to assert the
privilege and not testify to certain transactions.294 The use of informal
immunity also "left every witness in the posture of testifying with the
impression and fear that unless the witness' testimony pleased the gov-
ernment, the government might withdraw its assurances. "295, Even ex-
perienced attorneys were unsure of the effect of the agreement.296
Such actions by prosecutors are in direct conflict with the values
underlying the fifth amendment clause against self-incrimination and the
equal protection values embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The agreements obtained testimony for the government. How-
ever, because of the witnesses' fear, there was a real threat, as in
information obtained through tortured or forced confessions, 297 that the
information received was not reliable. There was a danger that the testi-
mony could be tainted since the witness was trying to insure his immu-
nity by pleasing the prosecutor.298 Further, similarly situated people
were treated dissimilarly.
With statutory immunity, the witnesses could have been assured of
their immunity and a record of the exact agreements obtained could have
been maintained, possibly centrally, to insure the agreements were inter-
preted consistently. Prosecutorial discretion could have been minimized
by guidelines, supervision and review. A degree of consistency could
290. 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
291. Id. at 1353.
292. Id. at 1337.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1338.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
298. Id.
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have been achieved so that certain defendants would not have been
duped or frightened into testifying. Rather than being arbitrary, the de-
fendants' deals could have been structured according to the nature and
degree of culpability for crimes and the extent of their cooperation.
This prosecutorial misconduct is only one example of the potential
for misuse of a prosecutor's superior bargaining position. A major con-
cern in informal immunity agreements is whether the informant-witness
was aware of his rights before making an agreement to modify them.
When an informant-witness makes an informal immunity agreement, in
effect he agrees to waive his privilege against self-incrimination by giving
information he is privileged from disclosing, in exchange for whatever
the prosecutor has promised. Such a waiver of this constitutional right is
allowed as long as the waiver is "knowing and voluntarily made."2 99
Even where a prosecutor interviews an informant-witness proffering in-
formation which might lead to an immunity grant, the Supreme Court
has said the prosecutor "should explain ... that he is not obliged to
criminate himself ....
C. Warning Before Waiver
In United States v. Quatermain 30l t the issue was the scope of an in-
formal immunity agreement. The court decided that ambiguities in the
written memorandum could not be construed to grant the defendant less
than the constitutional immunity because the defendant was not repre-
sented by counsel and because:
[T]he defendant gave up a constitutional right not to testify and
assisted the government. He should not be presumed to have
done so for less than his constitutional entitlement, absent any
evidence that he was informed of the scope of that right by the
government's attorney or that he knowingly and intelligently
waived it.
30 2
Thus, a warning of the sort mandated by Miranda v. Arizona 3 03 would be
in order before an informant-witness commits himself to an informal im-
munity agreement.
299. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968).
300. Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 604 (1878); see also In re Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198, 1200
(E.D. Ark. 1972) (warning of possible prosecution for testimony given in course of grand jury
investigation necessary). Further, the government must keep promises made in negotiations,
even if immunity is not eventually granted in exchange for the proffered information. United
States v. Lyons, 670 F.2d 77, 80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
301. 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980).
302. Id. at 788.
303. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The procedural safeguards proclaimed in Miranda, whereby a sus-
pect is informed of certain basic constitutional guarantees before law en-
forcement is permitted to question him, only apply to custodial
interrogations.30 4 Because informal immunity agreements often arise in
situations different than that envisioned by Miranda, informant-witnesses
are often not advised of the fifth amendment rights they waive in the
agreement. For instance, if an informant walks into a law enforcement
office to give information about a crime which would also incriminate
himself, the police would not be obligated to read him his Miranda
rights. He would therefore start providing incriminatory information
without knowing of his right to silence or the extent of it. The interro-
gators could get information which could be used as bargaining chips
against the informant.
Such information, arguably, could not be used against the informant
under Miranda. However, if the informant were ignorant of this privi-
lege, the interrogators could induce cooperation by saying they would
use the information as a basis for an indictment or an investigation
against the informant. The informant would be coerced into further co-
operation with the police because of ignorance of the constitutional right
to silence. This type of forced cooperation conflicts with the values of the
privilege against self-incrimination." 5 It is also an example of the worth-
lessness of a constitutional right of which the right-holder is not in-
formed. A statute allowing flexible immunity agreements should thus
incorporate a clause whereby informant-witnesses would be informed of
their rights before any information was given. Although it is arguable
that this might hinder the flow of information needed for law enforce-
ment purposes, if this information is currently received because of peo-
ple's ignorance of their constitutional rights, it is illegitimately received
in the first place. Further, studies of Miranda itself show that warnings
do not impede law enforcement's gathering of information.3" 6
D. Right to Counsel
An important element in Miranda v. Arizona is that the information
provided by a defendant is voluntary only if a right to counsel exists.30 7
The right to counsel should also be an indispensable element in respect to
flexible immunity agreements. As mentioned above, in United States v.
304. Id. at 478.
305. See supra notes 50-119 and accompanying text.
306. Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519
(1967).
307. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
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Quatermain,3 °8 ambiguities in an agreement were construed against the
government because the defendant was not provided counsel when he
agreed to his informal immunity grant.3 °9 In United States v. Kilpa-
trick,3 I° the government took advantage of ambiguities it created in the
agreement.
At least two general reasons exist for why there should be a right to
counsel for informant-witnesses when negotiating for immunity agree-
ments. The first is efficiency. Advocates of this view claim that two at-
torneys can create an agreement faster, more equitably and with fewer
ambiguities than can a lay person and an attorney. This argument is
weak because there are cases in which poor agreements were written by
attorneys.31i
The more powerful argument is one of fairness. A well established
assumption in law is that an attorney should represent a person in negoti-
ations with other attorneys. In respect to criminal procedure, this as-
sumption is incorporated in the ABA Standards for the Prosecution
Function concerning both plea discussions 312 and guilty pleas.313 The
standard regarding plea discussions reads:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in plea
discussions directly with an accused who is represented by
counsel, except with counsel's approval. Where the defendant
has properly waived counsel, the prosecuting attorney may en-
gage in plea discussions with the defendant, although ordinarily
a verbatim record of such discussions should be made and
preserved.314
The explanation of this standard reads:
The obvious policy of this rule is to protect a litigant against
overreaching by adversary counsel and it is applicable to crimi-
nal cases as well as civil litigation. Indeed, it has been held to
be a denial of the right of counsel for the prosecutor to negoti-
ate directly with the defendant in the absence of the defense
attorney.315
308. 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980).
309. Id. at 788.
310. 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1337 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 620
F.2d 286 (1980) (vague and badly drafted agreement negotiated between defendants' and gov-
ernment's attorneys).
312. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-4.1 (1978).
313. Id. § 14-3.1(a).
314. Id. § 34.1(b).
315. Id. (citations omitted).
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In respect to having a record when counsel has been waived, the explana-
tion reads:
Given the unequal bargaining positions between prosecutor and
defendant, the requirement of a verbatim record is necessary to
protect the prosecutor from charges of exerting undue
influence.3 16
Thus, the way to insure that a plea agreement is voluntary, and not due
to prosecutorial overreaching, is by having attorneys negotiate the deal.
The same is true with immunity agreements. To insure there is no
prosecutorial overreaching, immunity agreements need to be negotiated
between the defendant's and the government's attorneys. If an inform-
ant-witness cannot afford an attorney, one should be provided for him.
Some jurisdictions, such as Seattle, provide counsel before a witness is
sworn to testify before the grand jury. Witnesses may enter into an
agreement at that time.317 However, the question of whether there is a
right to counsel to negotiate immunity agreements has not yet arisen in
the federal courts.
Such a right, if it existed, would safeguard an informant-witness'
constitutional privilege and insure that the right against self-incrimina-
tion would only be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived. This
safeguard would further insure the protection of the fifth amendment val-
ues discussed earlier: the government would not be able to force some-
one to incriminate himself through overbearing prosecutors.
If there should be counsel for negotiations of immunity agreements,
because the prejudice of constitutional rights could be hindered by lack
of counsel, then the right to know that counsel can be appointed is sug-
gested by the rationale of Miranda. Miranda indicates that a suspect has
the right to remain silent until his counsel-appointed or retained-is
present.318 Miranda further requires that police must inform the suspect
of this fact, so he can waive it if he chooses. 319 Similarly, law enforce-
ment officials should warn an informant-witness that before he tells them
his information, he may want to have an attorney present to protect his
interests. The protection provided by an attorney would then include the
determination of whether and to what extent an immunity agreement
could be made. Until such an investigation could be completed, a com-
petent attorney would presumably tell his client to keep silent. Silence is,
of course, required to avoid prejudicing his bargaining position and to
316. Id.
317. United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985).
318. 384 U.S. at 467-79.
319. Id. at 479.
November 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
avoid giving law enforcement officials information before the grant of
immunity, which might be used against the informant-witness. This
would stop the threat of police and prosecutorial overreaching. The in-
formant-witness would have the counsel of someone who would know
the law which would counter the prosecutor's and police's arguments for
cooperation based on their own version of what the law was.
E. Supervision
Prosecutors have almost unlimited discretion as to whom to offer
immunity and to whom to deny it. In United States v. Librach,32 ° the
defendant challenged the prosecutor's decision to grant immunity to an-
other witness rather than the defendant. Although the court had sug-
gested the decision was unwise, it said that unless evidence was presented
to show the decision was arbitrary there could be no finding that there
was an abuse of discretion.321 In United States v. Kilpatrick,322 prosecu-
tors "liberally" granted informal immunity to witnesses in a tax shelter
grand jury investigation until it was decided "all good things come to an
end."' 323 Such unprincipled discretion does little to further the goal of
informal immunity: to obtain information about culpable criminal con-
duct from those who are minimally culpable and whom society must
forego the chance to prosecute. First come, first serve immunity only
creates a race to the prosecutor's office, not the important weighing in
which both the local prosecutor and Justice Department must engage to
insure a statutory granf of immunity is within the public interest.
A statute providing for flexible immunity agreements must force the
prosecutor to weigh appropriate factors and make an adequate record of
the weighing. 324 Prosecutorial abuses could also be minimalized if there
were supervisory control of immunity agreements. The present statute
already forces prosecutors to go to the Justice Department for approval
of grants of immunity, after which immunity is judicially issued.325 In-
formal immunity bypasses these methods, leaving the fate of the inform-
ant-witness subject to the prosecutor's whims. Although the prosecution
must have enough discretion to fashion a flexible immunity agreement
320. 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976).
321. Id. at 1230.
322. 594 F. Supp. at 1338.
323. Id.
324. See United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (1976) (decision to grant informal
immunity is not arbitrary if the record reveals the decision was made "in good faith and upon
consideration of appropriate factors").
325. See supra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
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for each particular informant-witness and each peculiar situation, super-
vision and guidelines would still enable such deals to be made.
The prosecutor still needs to be able to freely negotiate with inform-
ant-witnesses, so that the maximum information is obtained for the mini-
mal social price. The prosecutor is in a better position to know an
informant-witness's relative culpability than the Justice Department, but
he is also more likely to have his emotions blind his objectivity since he is
so closely involved with the investigation. Further, if he knows any
agreement made with an informant-witness will be scrutinized, even to a
small degree, by someone other than himself, he will have an incentive to
be more objective and cautious in making and drafting immunity
agreements.
Two obvious supervisory bodies exist, both of which are used by the
current immunity statute. The Justice Department approves and keeps
records of all statutory immunity grants.326 Although this approval is
almost automatic,327 it does force a public interest inquiry by both the
local prosecutor and, at least theoretically, the delegate of the attorney
general. 32 In defending the placing of approval and clearance of all fed-
eral immunity grants in the Justice Department, the Working Papers ac-
companying the statute say:
The argument for centralizing approval in the Attorney Gen-
eral is quite compelling. In a precise sense there is no "right"
to a grant of immunity. The starting point is a witness' plea of
the fifth amendment. At that point, if the government wishes
to go forward with the investigation it must make a determina-
tion in these terms: Is the public need for the particular testi-
mony or documentary information in question so great as to
override the social cost of granting immunity and thereby pos-
sibly pardoning a person who has violated the criminal law?
Such a calculation can be made only by a person familiar with
the total range of law enforcement policies which would be af-
fected by an immunity grant, and not by one familiar only with
the asserted public need in the particular case.329
A statute enabling flexible immunity agreements should also include
a provision whereby the Justice Department must approve the grant.
Much discretion would remain in the local prosecutor, but the final de-
tails of the deal would need to be approved. Speed should not be an
326. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). See also Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. at 1336-38, 1348-49.
327. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
328. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 264, at 1433-34.
329. Id. at 1433.
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issue. Even if the agreement has been worked out the day before the
information is needed, or before the testimony is supposed to be given
before a grand jury, the current Justice Department procedures allocate
resources so that approval can be given in a day. 33 If delay is necessary
to protect an individual's constitutional rights, delay is the price we pay
for living in a constitutional democracy. 331 This would discourage hast-
ily and poorly written immunity agreements in which last minute bar-
gaining creates ambiguities and interpretation problems.332
The other body to supervise flexible immunity agreements would be
the courts. Such supervision would raise controversial separation of
powers problems.3 33 The argument against the courts having a role in
grants of immunity is that the function of the court is not to weigh the
social costs of immunity against the need for information; this weighing
is something only a policy-making agent should do.334 If the decision to
grant immunity should exclusively belong to the executive branch, courts
would have nothing to review and no standards by which to review pros-
ecutors' grants of immunity.335 The judiciary would only hear evidence
on an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred. With respect to a fed-
eral immunity system where the Justice Department has to approve all
immunity grants, the courts in effect would be questioning whether the
Attorney General's, or his delegate's, action was in good faith.336 This
minimal review would be a mere shibboleth.
Judicial review of immunity grants, on the other hand, could be
more extensive. Although forcing a person to speak by a grant of immu-
nity is not prohibited by the fifth amendment,3 37 and a waiver of the fifth
amendment right to silence is permitted, a court could insure fifth
amendment values are protected by the immunity grant. A court could
330. See supra text accompanying note 213.
331. For further discussion of the social costs and balancing of constitutional protections in
the criminal procedural area and why we should pay them, see Sherman, Detailing the Excep-
tions that Swallow the Rule: The Woeful Directions of Our Supreme Court, COGITATIONS L. &
Gov'T, Apr. 1985, at 60.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467,473-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 620
F.2d 286 (1980) (hastily and poorly written agreement); United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1985) (agreement changed just prior to grand jury testimony).
333. Compare Librach, 536 F.2d at 1230 (decision to prosecute rests in the Executive
Branch) with United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1969) ("when the
conduct of an officer of the executive branch becomes enmeshed in the judicial process, the
courts have the power and resulting duty to supervise that conduct to the extent its [sic] uses
the judicial administration of criminal justice").
334. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 264, at 1435-36.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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hear evidence of whether an immunity agreement was a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. It could determine if
there were any threats which produced the immunity agreement, or
whether any other prosecutorial overreaching occurred.338 The argu-
ment that this review should be done before law enforcement officials
receive any information would be that a determination of the legitimacy
of the agreement before the information was received would assure that
an informant-witness was not compelled to provide incriminatory infor-
mation. Thus, such information would not be available for law enforce-
ment to use against him. An investigation initiated by such information
would be precluded and there would be no possibility that law enforce-
ment would use it in violation of an individual's fifth amendment rights.
However, a full-scale hearing before a grant of immunity might be a
costly use of judicial resources. It may be more economical to have a
hearing on the validity of an immunity agreement only if it went sour
and a prosecution ensued. This is how immunity grants are currently
reviewed. If law enforcement officials proceed with a prosecution against
someone to whom they have granted immunity, the court must decide: if
immunity was legitimately granted; the extent of the immunity; and on
what grounds the immunity was conditioned. If the court finds immu-
nity was indeed granted, then the defendant shifts "to the government
the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use
was derived from legitimate independent sources." '3 39 Otherwise, the evi-
dence is excluded. This procedure theoretically protects the defendant
from having information he gave in reliance on illegitimate immunity
used against him, protecting his fifth amendment privilege.3" Thus, ju-
dicial supervision of immunity agreements could be performed effectively
and economically in the course of a prosecution after an immunity agree-
ment has been made and becomes the subject of a subsequent challenge.
The court's inquiry at that time could insure that fifth amendment values
were protected, while determining the other procedural and substantive
issues.
338. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(g); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
339. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972); see also United States v. Deer-
field Specialty Papers, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 796, 800-01 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
340. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing this does not in fact
protect privilege because the government might still find ways to use evidence obtained under
immunity grant).
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VI. INTERPRETATION OF IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS:
TRANSACTIONAL VERSUS USE IMMUNITY
The most difficult task for courts with respect to the flexibility of
informal immunity agreements is to interpret them. A great deal de-
pends upon this interpretation, including constitutional values and the
freedom or incarceration of the informant-witness. A statute cannot re-
solve all of the interpretation problems which arise in flexible immunity
agreements. Each agreement will present individual problems which can
only be settled by viewing the entire agreement and looking "to the evi-
dence of the setting in which the agreement was reached and to the con-
text of immunity law." '34 1 Because an immunity agreement involves a
quid pro quo, where each side often has many bargaining chips and
goals, both courts and legislators must give prosecutors flexibility to cre-
ate an agreement suitable to the particular circumstances. This allows
the informant-witness to exchange his information-information which
the fifth amendment assures he is not compelled to disclose if it is incrim-
inating-to limit his criminal liability.
Society gains evidence of, and often convictions for, antisocial crimi-
nal activity. But this exchange only takes place if both society and the
informant-witness are assured that the bargain between them is honored.
Thus, a court must determine just what was intended to be agreed to by
both sides, using the background of immunity law to guide the process.
The legislature's role is to enable the bargaining to take place and to give
parameters to the process.
The current immunity statute provides for use and derivative use
immunity, which the court in Kastigar v. United States342 approved as
being the constitutional minimum.343 Some courts have assumed this
limits prosecutors to use and derivative use informal immunity grants as
well. 3" But the Kastigar court also indicated that jurisdictions might
allow, although not constitutionally required to allow, the broader trans-
actional immunity.3 45 Thus, since states may provide transactional im-
munity, so could a federal flexible immunity enabling statute.
341. United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
342. 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
343. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 459.
344. United States v. Society of Indep. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461, 474 (4th Cir.
1979); Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. at 788.
345. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. This Article uses transactional immunity to represent any
sort of immunity which might be more encompassing than the constitutional minimal use and
derivative use immunity. The analysis is the same under any standard broader than use and
derivative use immunity.
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There are several rationales in favor of giving prosecutors the power
to grant transactional immunity in agreements. Initially, the power to
grant transactional immunity would give prosecutors room to negotiate.
Transactional immunity would be a bargaining chip to get the informant-
witness to cooperate in ways that he would not otherwise cooperate. It
might be seen as an award for such cooperation. For instance, an in-
formant-witness might have information about a gun smuggling conspir-
acy. Law enforcement officials may want to arrest members of the
conspiracy while involved in a transaction where they could obtain phys-
ical evidence. They might ask the informant to set up the deal. Because
such an arrangement would subject the informant-witness to great risk,
prosecutors might reward such risk with transactional immunity, instead
of just use and derivative use immunity. Of course, they could accom-
plish the same thing, and often do, by simply using their discretion not to
prosecute the informant-witness. However, if transactional immunity
were part of an agreement, the informant-witness would be protected
from prosecution for that transaction in other jurisdictions as well.
If flexible immunity agreements are viewed as a complement to the
current federal immunity statute which compels testimony, a better un-
derstanding of the necessity of allowing transactional immunity grants
becomes clear. There is little incentive for a person to be more than a
witness if he gains nothing beyond the use and derivative use immunity
he would obtain through normal channels. Transactional immunity pro-
vides something that a person with information could not otherwise re-
ceive by the mere assertion of his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. At the same time, it gives law enforcement officials a
chance to receive information, cooperation and assistance that they
might not otherwise be able to obtain.34 6 A federal flexible immunity
enabling statute should clearly state that a prosecutor can grant transac-
tional immunity, while not precluding the granting of the constitutional
use and derivative use immunity.
A. Meaning of Immunity
A problem has arisen in informal immunity cases regarding the
meaning of the word "immunity" in a written memorandum of an agree-
346. In fact, current agreements for nonprosecution often provide for cooperation in ex-
change for nonprosecution of the revealed crime. Ironically, in respect to the incriminatory
information provided in reliance on such agreements, the prosecutor is providing transactional
immunity without statutory authority, while if he were working under the statute, the most he
could provide would be use and derivative use immunity. This is another anomoly remedied
by a flexible immunity statute.
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ment.347 If either transactional or use and derivative use immunity may
be granted, only an explicit recitation of the type of immunity agreed
upon would protect the parties to the agreement. Immunity agreements
must spell out the exact type of immunity which is being provided, and
what, if any conditions are attached.348
In one case, in which the author was involved, the government
promised not to charge the defendant for crimes he had revealed in ex-
change for his cooperation and assistance.349 At the end of the typewrit-
ten memorandum of the agreement, a handwritten sentence was added
just before the defendant was to testify before the grand jury. The sen-
tence created terrible confusion. It read: "[t]he use immunity conferred
by this letter shall be transformed into transactional immunity at the
completion of the trials of this case, provided you comply in good faith
with the ... conditions outlined in this letter. 353 The type and the tim-
ing of the immunity had to be determined by the court, as well as the
issue of what good faith meant. The sentence could have meant that two
types of immunity were provided by the agreement: use immunity dur-
ing the investigation, and transactional immunity at the investigation's
completion. It could have been an exchange of use immunity for the
defendant's information and testimony, giving the defendant what he
would have received had he been compelled to testify before the grand
jury by statutory immunity, and transactional immunity in exchange for
the defendant's cooperation and assistance in the investigation of the
crimes he revealed. Although the author suggested these interpretations
to the Ninth Circuit panel, the court expressed doubt in oral argument as
to whether the prosecutor could even grant transactional immunity. If a
statute enabling such immunity agreements expressly included the power
to grant transactional immunity, such confusion would be prevented in
the future. Supervision of such an agreement might have prevented the
ambiguity.
B. Remedies for Broken Agreements
In United States v. Irvine,51 the court was presented with the issue
347. See, e.g., United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v. Kates,
419 F. Supp. 846, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985).
348. United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 46 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
349. The author was involved with this case as a student at the University of Southern
California Law Center Post-Conviction Justice Project.
350. United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985).
351. 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985).
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of what happens when immunity is conditioned on certain acts of the
defendant." 2 The government alleged that the defendant did not abide
by the conditions, and prosecuted him for the underlying crimes he dis-
closed to it and the grand jury.353 The trial court was thus faced with
interpreting the meaning of the conditions enumerated in the agreement
and deciding whether the conditions had been met.35 4 Irvine's agreement
included a provision for a polygraph test, an agreement to assist in the
collection of evidence about the transactions about which he gave infor-
mation and any other investigation in the jurisdiction, and a condition of
no deception.35 5 By not meeting any of these conditions, Irvine was lia-
ble for the underlying charge. The government was therefore able to use
Irvine in their investigations while Irvine could not refuse because he was
under the threat of prosecution based on his own testimony.
This situation raises the question: how long can the government use
an informant-witness before he is assured that the testimony he gave will
not be used against him? The longer the period of time, the more chance
an informant-witness will breach one of the conditions. For instance, he
might be in a situation where he is confronted by those about whom he is
giving information. He might need to lie or break a condition of staying
silent about the investigation to protect his safety. A well-written immu-
nity agreement would provide for a specific amount of time, but good
drafting alone may not be sufficient protection. A statute might have a
statute of limitations, after which time the government would be pre-
vented from using the information provided under a putative grant of
immunity, even if one or more conditions are deemed subsequently bro-
ken by the informant-witness. This would further serve as an incentive
for the government diligently to complete the investigation produced by
the informant-witness' information and minimize the danger the inform-
ant-witness would be put in either by giving the information or by the
government's use of his assistance in obtaining evidence.356
352. Id. at 709-10.
353. Id. at 710.
354. It is not this Article's task to reargue the case, rather it is to raise the problems in the
current informal immunity regime. These problems might be minimalized by a statute en-
abling flexible immunity.
355. Irvine, 756 F.2d at 709-10.
356. If the government were completely prohibited from using information derived from an
immunity agreement, even if the informant-witness broke a condition of the agreement, a stat-
ute of limitations clause would not be necessary. Because this Article asserts, at infra notes
373-85 and accompanying text, that the fifth amendment and fairness prevents the use of infor-
mation obtained by an immunity agreement against the giver, and instead advocates a penalty
clause to keep an informant-witness cooperating, this Article does not incorporate a statute of
limitations in the proposed flexible immunity statute.
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In the landmark case of Santobello v. New York,3 -7 the Supreme
Court stated with respect to plea bargaining: "when a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled." '358 This is also the case with immunity agreements.35 9
Although it is clear that the prosecution should be held to the agreement
it made, there is often a question as to what actions of the defendant
breach the agreement and what remedies the government has in the case
of such a breach.
An initial problem is the relationship between an immunity agree-
ment and an agreement of nonprosecution to understand the remedy
problem. Informal immunity agreements are generally understood to be
part of a prosecutor's discretion not to prosecute, in other words, a sub-
set of nonprosecution agreements.3 60 However, as discussed above3 61 im-
munity agreements trigger a different analysis. Even when the word
"immunity" is not used in an agreement, if self-incriminatory informa-
tion is provided, an agreement for nonprosecution includes an agreement
not to use that testimony against the informant-witness. This agreement
provides the immunity exchanged for the non assertion of the fifth
amendment right which triggers the need to protect fifth amendment
values.362
Nonprosecution agreements could be made where no incriminatory
information is given to law enforcement officials by the informant-wit-
ness. For instance, a person charged with one crime may know of a
worse crime with which he was not involved. Information on the other
crime may be offered to law enforcement officials in exchange for their
promise not to prosecute him for the crime with which the person is
already charged. No fifth amendment problems would be encountered in
such a situation. A nonprosecution agreement of this type might be ana-
lyzed under contract law terms so that each party would receive the ben-
efit of the bargain.363
The situation in United States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc. 31
357. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
358. Id. at 262.
359. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1972).
360. United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 44-45 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
361. See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 130-95 and accompanying text.
363. United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Deerfield
Specialty Papers, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 796, 800-01 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
364. 501 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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illustrates the confusion that the courts encounter in this sort of circum-
stance. In that case, a defendant filed for the dismissal of an indictment
because it was obtained through information provided to the government
pursuant to an informal immunity grant.365 The court ruled that an evi-
dentiary hearing was necessary to determine if the agreement should be
characterized as a grant of immunity or as a nonprosecution agree-
ment.366 The court held that the following letter memoralized one of the
two types of agreements:
This is to confirm our appointment for February 28 at 12
o'clock. As we discussed, based upon your representation of
your medical history and your offer of cooperation with the Gov-
ernment, the Antitrust Division does not intend to prosecute you
for any violation of the antitrust laws based on the information
or testimony you may give in connection with this matter.367
The court "preliminarily" noted that this language suggested an
agreement of nonprosecution, "rather than a blind grant of informal im-
munity. '368 At the same time, however, the court noted the letter's sim-
ilarity to an agreement in United States v. Quatermain 369 which that
court had held to provide informal immunity.37 ° The letter in
Quatermain read:
This letter is to confirm our understanding with respect to your
cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the
United States Attorney's Office .... It has been agreed that in
return for your cooperation and truthful testimony in any court
proceeding related to these matters that the Government will pro-
vide you with immunity from prosecution for your participation
and involvement with Zelman A. Fairoth and others relating to
the manufacture of methamphetamine.371
It would be odd if the distinction between the letters turned on the
appearance or nonappearance of the word "immunity." Such formalities
neither serve the administration of justice nor fifth amendment values. If
a prosecutor can avoid the requirements of immunity law by using words
which signify the same thing, i.e. "does not intend to prosecute you
... based on information or testimony you may give," then an informant-
365. Id. at 800.
366. Id. at 802-03.
367. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original).
368. Id.
369. 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
370. 501 F. Supp. at 801-02.
371. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38, 44 (3d.
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980)).
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witness's fifth amendment rights may be undermined. Only if the in-
formant-witness had retained or was appointed an attorney familiar
enough with the intricacies of immunity law to point out this subterfuge
would such an informant-witness be protected. It would make more log-
ical and constitutional sense if the distinction between the two sorts of
agreements depended upon the sort of information provided by the
agreement and the voluntariness involved. 372 If self-incriminatory infor-
mation were provided, then the agreement would be correctly character-
ized as an immunity agreement and fifth amendment rights could be
protected through immunity law. However, if no self-incriminatory in-
formation were provided, the nonprosecution agreement would still be
deemed complete by contract standards.
C. Breach of Agreement
A court's analysis of an agreement significantly affects the remedy
for a putative breach of the agreement by the informant-witness, who at
this point would be a defendant. The inquiry becomes: (1) what actions
by an informant-witness would constitute a breach of the agreement; and
(2) if a breach occurred, with what crimes can the government charge the
informant-witness. In the case of a nonprosecution agreement, the court
uses a contractual analysis; a breach of any condition, whether material
or not, breaches the whole agreement and allows the government to pros-
ecute.373 On the other hand, for an immunity agreement, different con-
stitutional values must be protected so that a person is not compelled to
incriminate himself.
When an immunity agreement is breached, a contractual analysis
premised on performing all conditions does not adequately protect fifth
amendment rights. In a typical breach of immunity agreement, an in-
formant-witness reveals incriminatory information to a law enforcement
entity or to a grand jury, and breaches one or more conditions of the
agreement subsequent to that disclosure. For instance, the informant-
witness may refuse to assist in an arrest of the person against whom he
testified, or he may refuse to give further testimony. In response, the
government will prosecute the informant-witness by using the testimony
or information he already gave to the government under the impression
that it was immunized. Thus, the government's use of this information
acts as a retroactive withdrawal of the immunity grant after the damag-
372. For a discussion of the voluntariness issue, see infra notes 373-76 and accompanying
text.
373. United States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 796, 800-01 n.3 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (1981).
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ing information had already been revealed. The words once out of the
informant's mouth cannot be returned. However, the information was
only revealed on the proviso that it be immunized. The information was
only voluntary to the extent that it would not be used against the inform-
ant-witness. When the immunity is "revoked," the information previ-
ously obtained is no longer voluntary. It becomes retroactively
compelled incriminatory information which is being used against the in-
formant-witness. The government cannot constitutionally use such in-
voluntarily obtained information against a defendant.
Opposed to this reasoning is the view that the information or testi-
mony is not compelled because inititally it was voluntarily given, and the
conditions on which the immunity grant depended were voluntarily
breached by the informant. Thus, the situation is aptly characterized as:
the informant-witness made his own bed, and now he has to sleep in it.
The informant-witness freely bargained for immunity received in ex-
change for the information given when waiving the fifth amendment
privilege. If he breaks the bargained-for conditions, he will have to pay
the consequences: no immunity. Although this is intuitively a powerful
argument, it discounts the importance of the policies underlying the fifth
amendment. Furthermore, the argument assumes equal bargaining
power between informant-witnesses and prosecutors, which is a dubious
assumption, even when the informant-witness is represented by counsel.
Fifth amendment policies must be enforced even if the informant-
witness breached conditions of the agreement. Because the information
obtained is only voluntary to the extent that it was immunized, it be-
comes involuntary when used against the informant. Although the
agreement voluntarily included conditions, it was a voluntary agreement
to provide information, information which was not supposed to be used
against the informant, information which would not have even been
known by the government except for the promise of immunity.
It must be made clear that this is not a Miranda v. Arizona 374 con-
fession situation. There, if Miranda is complied with, a confession is vol-
untarily made on the basis that it will be used against the maker.375 The
confession is voluntary as long as the defendant knows it will be used
against him; its use is not conditioned on doing certain things.
The information obtained through informal immunity is different.
It is not an admission of guilt. It is the information intended to allow law
enforcement to make its case against others, not the provider of the infor-
374. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
375. Id. at 478.
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mation. Once the information is given, it cannot be taken back. The
informant then has the Sword of Damocles, of his own making, dangling
over his head, forcing the actions on which the government has condi-
tioned his immunity. However, he only gave the information in the first
place to be used against other people, not himself. The argument that
since the informant voluntarily agreed that if he did not perform the con-
ditions on which his immunity is based, the information could be used
against him, and further, that his breaching his conditions voluntarily
breached the agreement, only show the voluntariness of the agreement,
not the information obtained.
The very fact that immunity is given in exchange for the informa-
tion shows that the information is not voluntarily given. As the first part
of this Article shows, immunity is given to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination. Immunity protects one who has given information
which he would otherwise not have had to give but for the immunity
grant. This is the only way the values which animate the fifth amend-
ment can be protected. It is the only way to insure no involuntarily ob-
tained information may be used against the person who supplied the
information. Just because an agreement was voluntarily entered and sub-
sequently breached, does not make the information thereby provided vol-
untary. The information is only a by-product of the immunity grant.
Once the grant is abrogated, even if it was agreed in advance that it could
be abrogated, the information would no longer be voluntarily obtained.
Unless the immunity grant is judicially enforced, fifth amendment values
are undermined when a person's involuntary statements are used to in-
criminate him.
However, the government still needs a hold on an informant-witness
when it enters into an immunity agreement. An informant-witness, of
course, needs an incentive to live up to the agreement's conditions.
Although the government would violate fifth amendment values by using
the obtained information against a breacher, the government may prose-
cute for any subsequent violation of law. Prosecution could occur in a
number of ways. First, a flexible immunity statute could be enacted that
would make breach of the agreement a violation of law, and fix a certain
substantial punishment for such a breach. Second, the violation of an
immunity agreement may inherently break other laws. For instance, if
the agreement contained a condition of truthful testimony, the violation
of this condition would result in a perjury action. If the promised coop-
eration in the investigation was not forthcoming, it may be possible to
indict the informant-witness for obstruction of justice. Finally, if the
breach of the agreement violates laws that are unrelated to the inform-
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ant-witness' testimony, then law enforcement officials can prosecute for
those particular crimes. For example, if an informant-witness testified
about gun trafficking in July and engaged in gun running in September,
he could still be prosecuted for the subsequent crime of the September
gun running.
In effect, once a person has testified or given information in reliance
on a grant of immunity, whether statutory, informal or conditional, he
has precluded the government from ever using his testimony or informa-
tion against him. This preclusion is what the privilege against self-in-
crimination demands. The current immunity statute incorporates this
idea by saying that testimony or information obtained by an immunity
grant can only be used in a "prosecution for perjury, giving a false state-
ment, or otherwise failing to comply with the order [to testify]."376
Cases have held that when a witness abrogates his immunity agreement,
the testimony can only be used against him as a basis for a prosecution
for perjury and similar charges.377
Similar to formal immunity agreements, the government is limited
in its use of information obtained through informal immunity agreements
even when the informant-witness breaches the agreement. In United
States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers,3 78 the court held that if an eviden-
tiary hearing showed that an immunity agreement existed, "the govern-
ment must establish evidence derived from sources independent of the
defendant and supportive of the indictment," '379 or it would not be able to
proceed with the indictment. Similarly, in United States v. Kurzer,38° the
government argued that the defendant forfeited his immunity by lying to
the government while iimunized. The government characterized
Kurzer as "less than candid in his conversations with Government
agents [and in] his testimony before the grand jury. ' 38 1 However, the
court dismissed the argument by stating: "the ordinary remedy for the
Government when an immunized witness lies or fails to cooperate fully is
a prosecution for perjury or for contempt, rather than abrogation of the
immunity agreement .... ,"382 The Kurzer court's holding also suggests
that minimal breaches of conditions of informal immunity agreements do
376. 18 U.S.C. § 6002(c) (1982).
377. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d
534, 543 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
378. 501 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
379. Id. at 801 n.3.
380. 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976).
381. Id. at 518.
382. Id.
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not breach the entire agreement. 3
The one case contrary to this idea is United States v. Irvine.384 In
Irvine, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's violation of a condi-
tion to an informal immunity agreement vitiated the immunity so that
the government could use his testimony against him. The government
was allowed to prosecute on the underlying criminal activity about which
Irvine testified.
To summarize, the current state of informal immunity agreements
and the case law that has developed around them, suggest problems that
can be easily avoided by the adoption of a flexible immunity statute.
These cases, together with the fifth amendment values and policies which
animate them, indicate that a flexible immunity statute would enable
prosecutors to grant as much transactional immunity as they desire, in-
stead of being bound by the constitutional minimum of use and deriva-
tive use immunity. The immunity promised by the prosecutor, whatever
its extent, should be enforceable in all jurisdictions. Such a statute
should provide that before information is obtained through such agree-
ments, informant-witnesses should be warned of their fifth amendment
right to silence and a right to counsel. Indigents should be provided
counsel for the negotiation and drafting of the agreements. The Justice
Department, through the Attorney General or his delegates, should ap-
prove all grants, while judicial protection can be achieved in litigation if
an informant-witness is subsequently prosecuted. Immunity agreements
should be entered into whenever self-incriminatory information is re-
ceived by law enforcement on account of a promise. Once that informa-
tion is received, it could no longer be the basis of a prosecution on the
crime revealed. Under a flexible immunity statute, only perjury, obstruc-
tion of justice, and a statutory crime for breaking the immunity agree-
ment could be charged.
A flexible immunity statute, based on the above, would read some-
thing like the following:
An Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) may enter
into an agreement with a person who has information about
criminal activity, whereby the AUSA, as representative of the
government, offers immunity either from prosecution for the
transaction, or from use of incriminatory testimony or informa-
tion, in exchange for such information or testimony. The
agreement made by the AUSA is binding on all jurisdictions of
383. Id. See also United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 748 (D.D.C. 1969) (minor
breach by defendant does not preclude finding of performance of agreement).
384. 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the United States. The immunity may be conditioned on any-
thing agreed to by the informant-witness and the AUSA, pro-
vided that:
(1) No incriminatory information is received
before the informant-witness is warned of his right to remain
silent under the fifth amendment, and right to attorney under
the sixth amendment.
(2) The informant-witness is provided counsel, if
he cannot afford it, to negotiate and draft such immunity
agreement.
(3) The Attorney General, Deputy Assistant At-
torney, or any designated Assistant Attorney General must ap-
prove the final draft of the immunity agreement.
Information or testimony given in reliance on such immu-
nity agreements will not be the basis of a prosecution, except
for perjury, giving a false statement, or breaking the immunity
agreement. An informant-witness, breaking the immunity
agreement, either by breaching an agreed to condition, or the
entire agreement, will make the informant-witness liable for a
five year prison term.385
VII. CURRENT INFORMAL IMMUNITY LAW
The current conflicts in informal immunity law illustrate why a stat-
ute allowing prosecutors to make flexible immunity agreements is so im-
portant. Although the majority of cases assume that informal immunity
grants are enforceable "to the same extent as a formal grant of immu-
nity," '386 there are cases which hold that informal immunity grants are
illegal and are unenforceable against either defendants 387 or the govern-
ment.388 The example of an immunity statute given above would codify
385. Five years seems long enough a period to create a disincentive to not cooperate with
law enforcement by breaking the agreement.
386. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Other cases holding informal immunity agree-
ments to be enforceable include: United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981);
United States v. Society of Indep. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1976); Rowe v. Griffin, 497 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Ala.
1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782, 790
(E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954
(1980); In re Kelley, 350 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1972); United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp.
742 (D.D.C. 1969).
387. Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878); United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D.
Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
388. United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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much of what is in fact existing law. It would protect the government
from losing information due to an attorney's advice to a client not to
enter into immunity agreements because of their questionable legality.
More importantly, a flexible immunity statute would protect informant-
witnesses who give information relying on prosecutors' promises of im-
munity, and are subsequently indicted because a court ruled that the
prosecutor had no authority to enter into such an agreement.
The argument that informal immunity agreements are not binding
on the government stems from the fact that a prosecutor has no authority
to bind the government.389 This position has most recently been ap-
proved by a court in United States v. Kates. 390 In Kates, the judge stated
that "the United States [was] not bound by [the] unauthorized acts" of
an Assistant United States Attorney who entered an immunity agree-
ment without authority.391 The unauthorized agent problem, which pre-
cluded a valid immunity grant in Kates, was solved by Judge Winter of
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Carter.392 This often quoted pas-
sage appeared:
If there be fear that an United States Attorney may unreasona-
bly bargain away the government's right and duty to prosecute,
the solution lies in the administrative controls which the Attor-
ney General of the United States may promulgate to regulate
and control the conduct of cases by the United States Attorneys
and their assistants. The solution does not lie in formalisms
about the express, implied or apparent authority of one United
States Attorney, or his representative, to bind another United
States Attorney and thus visit a ... sentence on a defendant in
violation of a bargain he fully performed. There is more at
stake than just the liberty of th[e] defendant. At stake is the
honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair admin-
istration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice in
a federal scheme of government.393
Thus, as Winter noted, a government agent's promise of immunity must
be abided by, if for no other reason, because the keeping of such promises
is vital to the effective and fair administration of justice.
Another reason why the government should not be able to renege on
389. For both sides of this argument, see supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
390. Kates, 419 F. Supp. at 858.
391. Id. For a survey on the state law in regard to nonstatutory grants of immunity by
local prosecutors, see Note, Judicial Supervision of Non-Statutory Immunity, 65 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 334 (1974).
392. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
393. Id. at 428.
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its agent's promise of an immunity grant stems from the contractual doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.394 This doctrine holds that if a person has
reasonably relied on a promise and has thereby changed his position, the
promisor will be held to abide by the terms of his promise. The fact that
the government did not authorize the immunity is not dispositive; rather,
the important fact is whether an informant detrimentally relied on and
reasonably changed his position because someone whom he thought had
authority promised him immunity. The information or testimony ob-
tained should therefore not be used against him. United States v.
Carter39 held: "if the promise was made to defendant ... and defendant
relied upon it in incriminating himself and others, the government should
be held to abide by its terms.
39 6
Simply stated, the estoppel argument is that it is reasonable to rely
on an assurance of informal immunity.3 97 A flexible immunity enabling
statute avoids the examination of the reasonableness of a defendant's reli-
ance. Furthermore, since most courts accept informal immunity agree-
ments as binding, a person could reasonably change his position in
response to a promise of informal immunity. Under a flexible immunity
statute, an attorney might reasonably advise his client that such an agree-
ment was binding. Additionally, even if the informant-witness was not
advised by counsel, a layperson, untrained in the law, could expect that a
prosecutor has the power to negotiate an agreement to exchange infor-
mation for immunity. In United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline
Marketers,398 the Fourth Circuit held that:
The question is whether [the defendant], as a layman, acted rea-
sonably in relying upon ... assurances of immunity, and our
appraisal of such reliance should not be made on the basis of
any fine-fingered legal analysis .... "[C]onstitutional decisions
cannot be made to turn in favor of the government on the for-
tuities of communications or on a refusal to accord any sub-
stantive value to reasonably induced expectations that
government will honor its firmly advanced proposals.,
399
394. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
395. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
396. Id. at 427-28.
397. See, e.g., United States v. Society of Indep. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461, 472-73
(4th Cir. 1979).
398. 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979).
399. Id. at 473 (citation omitted). It should be noted that there are cases in which coopera-
tion agreements were made between police and defendants. These cases have held that because
police have no statutory power to grant immunity, even if the agreements are fulfilled by the
defendant, the police's promise cannot bar prosecution. However, these cases may be read not
as agency problems, but in respect to promissory estoppel law. It might be unreasonable-
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A California case provides another reason why informal immunity
reasons should be enforced against the state. It combines the above two
rationales:
It would be anomalous to permit the People, represented by the
district attorney, to argue that an earlier agreement entered
into by the district attorney was void for lack of compliance
with a statute of whose existence the district attorney must
have been aware. "[I]f a prosecutor, in the furtherance of jus-
tice, makes an agreement to withhold prosecution, the court
may, upon proper showing, even in the absence of statute au-
thority, honor the undertaking."'
Another California case explains: "the prosecution may be estopped
from asserting the lack of compliance with the statute. However, in cases
where the courts have found estoppel, the person claiming immunity had
already testified and completed his part of the bargain.40 1
Fifth amendment values and policies also support upholding infor-
mal immunity agreements against the government, which is analogous to
compelling a person to make incriminating statements against himself.
A statement obtained in this manner would be involuntary, unknowing
and certainly not intelligent. Miranda v. Arizona 40 2 mandates that waiv-
ers of the fifth amendment right to silence be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent in order "to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.,
40 3
As this Article argues, the only way to prevent the undermining of the
fifth amendment when unauthorized informal immunity is granted is to
abide by the promise and exclude any evidence derived from that testi-
mony or information from being used against the giver of that informa-
tion.4' Thus, under an informal immunity agreement or flexible
immunity statute, the policies and values of the fifth amendment men-
tioned in this Article's first section would be upheld to the fullest extent
possible.4 5
even for a lay person-to think that police have the power not to prosecute in exchange for
immunity. Police are not prosecutors. See Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.
1969).
400. People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 915, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (1973) (citations
omitted).
401. People v. Yu, 143 Cal. App. 3d 358, 369, 191 Cal. Rptr. 859, 864-65 (1983) (citations
omitted).
402. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
403. Id. at 444.
404. See supra notes 373-85 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text. It should be noted that such an exclu-
sionary rule would not completely remedy the improper acquiring of information. For in-
stance, if an informant told law enforcement of criminal activity which they did not know
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Opponents of an informal immunity agreement could argue that en-
tering into an informal immunity agreement is a voluntary act, so the
information or testimony derived is not compelled. However, the ease
with which a prosecutor can get statutory immunity and compel an in-
formant-witness to give information cannot be ignored." 6 Informal im-
munity is used by prosecutors as an alternative to statutory immunity. 4°7
If both sides know how easy the compulsion of testimony is, they may
agree to the nonstatutory method. Refusing to do so would gain nothing.
An informant-witness could still be compelled to testify anyhow for the
minimal use and derivative use immunity.
In addition, the testimony or information is given only as a result of
the immunity promise. If the testimony is voluntary at all, it is voluntary
only to the extent that the informant-witness gets the bargained-for ex-
change without which he would not have given any information. How-
ever, if there is no fulfillment of the agreement on the part of the
government, then there is no incentive for the informant to provide the
information. When the information is already given, what might have
been initially a voluntary act of giving information, becomes an involun-
tary and compelled act upon the government's refusal or inability to ful-
fill its part of the agreement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article's title is taken from an admonition in a song by the rock
group, the Grateful Dead." 8 Because of the informality of informal im-
munity agreements, it is possible that, "the deal goes down." Such an
occurrence is a tragedy. It is a tragedy, not because a culpable criminal
is incarcerated for crimes he committed, but because it is a violation of
the fifth amendment and the history and policies that underlie it. It is
another strike at that battered parchment, the Constitution.
The purpose of this Article has simply been to explore the history
and discover the policies animating the fifth amendment in order to find
guidelines for an informal immunity statute which would fulfill the re-
quirements of the fifth amendment. Such a statute must provide the con-
about, the police might reasonably initiate an investigation into that activity that they would
not otherwise have started. If evidence is subsequently discovered which incriminates the orig-
inal informant, and if the police could show that it was independent of the original information
provided by the informant, then they might be able to prosecute him. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
406. See supra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
407. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1337 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 82i
F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
408. GARCIA & HUNTER, Deal in GRATEFUL DEAD ANTHOLOGY 123, 124 (1979).
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stitutional minimum of use and derivative use immunity and should
allow for transactional immunity. This will give flexibility to prosecutors
and informant-witnesses to fashion agreements where they can work to-
gether to uncover criminal activity. Further, the statute should provide
for counsel for indigents, and disclosure of such a. right. Most impor-
tantly, although the statute should allow the agreement to include certain
conditions, it should also foreclose the possibility that information ob-
tained through an immunity grant could ever be used against the pro-
vider. Instead, it should include other incentives to insure the
cooperation of the informant-witness. Only in this way can constitu-
tional values be upheld.
